Sunday, February 27, 2011

Peter Lombard and The Existence of God

An excerpt from an article I wrote:

Peter begins his metaphysics by providing four interesting arguments for the existence of God. The following arguments highlight Peter’s philosophical influences systematically through Abelard, yet also demonstrating dependency on Augustinian philosophy mirroring the Victorines. Hence, Peter’s arguments for the existence of God provide a window into the middle ground Peter tried to navigate between a Victorine (and Porphyrian) Neo-Platonism and a Abelardian methodology, while at the same time reflecting his own undeniable philosophical genius.

Peter’s first argument for the existence of God is a hypothetical situation. Peter asks us to imagine a person who is contemplating the empirical world. Imagine a person who sees and understands that everything around him or her seemingly changes. Heraclitus was partially right, we do indeed live in a world of change. The child changes into an adult, the night into the day, the tree into lumber. Change is constantly all around us, each being changing into something else. Moreover, it seems, every being comes to existence through the power of a different being. The house built by the laborer, the tree is grown out of the soil, the infant born from the mother, the sea vessel built by the shipwrights, knowledge gleaned from a teacher, or a painting formed from the idea in the mind of the painter. From such awareness of change we must conclude that there must logically be a creature which caused into being all that exists around us. If everything has a being which caused it, there must be a being that also caused everything around us. However, here we are met with a dilemma; no one has ever seen a creature with the ability and power to accomplish such an enormous task. We have plenty of observed evidence of beings creating or changing other beings, but we have no such observation of the creation of creation. Moreover, any empirical creature capable of creating everything around us is not observed, and even if such an empirical creature was observed, we would then simply ask, what caused him? But to continually ask, what caused him, and the cause of him, and the cause of the cause, would be to ask ad infinitum. Yet, as is observably true, all things are caused by a being. Therefore, we must conclude that there is a being above all the created beings which is capable of this creation, yet who himself was not caused. It is this being that we call God.[1]

Peter’s second argument is in direct reference to Aristotelian causality and offers the reader a glimpse into Peter’s own philosophical training, or at the least his partial awareness of the Aristotelian corpus. This second argument is also based on the concept of change. Peter argues that we ought to look around ourselves at the empirical world. Just as the above scenario, we easily notice a constant element to reality, namely that things change. The baby grows into adulthood, the chestnut into an oak tree and the tree into a house. All things that exist, seemingly, necessarily change. Yet, we are met with another puzzling dilemma. If we are cognitively aware that everything around us is changing, how are we even aware of the concept of change to begin with? If everything was in a state of change, then we would never know it as change, as we would have nothing to judge change against. If all that exists changes, then there is nothing to recognize that there is in fact a change occurring. Where do we get the notion of change from if everything observable is changing? Only the existence of the eternal and unchanging allows for us to recognize the changing in observable things. Yet, where do we observe the eternal unchanging in the empirical world? We just said everything around us that is observable is changing. Rather, there must be an unchanging eternality which exists outside of change (temporality), yet allows us to hold the empirical world against it to understand our own changing world. It is this unchanging eternality that we call God.[2]

The above arguments both share interesting philosophical presuppositions. First, both of the above arguments reflect the empirical, natural world as the starting point for argumentation. In presupposing empiricism and the state of nature as the criteria for religious epistemology, Peter implicitly acknowledges and embraces natural ontology (theology) and affirms the mind’s ability to arrive at knowledge of God through nature. Moreover the Lombard affirms a correspondence theory of truth where the agent knows an object through direct abstraction (passive observation) of the object’s form. (What is unclear so far is whether it is an Aristotelian hylomorphic abstraction of the agent intellect and then forming a habitual intellect, or whether it is a Platonic recollection of the form.) Either way, we know the changing object is a real being, hence we know there must be a God who is a real being. As a result, Peter exposes a preliminary mark of what will be scholasticism and foreshadows the thirteenth century and Thomas Aquinas. Second, both of the above arguments reflect knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy and a willingness to employ Aristotelian philosophy in typically Neo-Platonic environments. Moreover, the second argument is entirely based on a pre-Socratic argument that was also predominant in the work of both Plato and Aristotle. Hence, we can rightfully conclude that Peter purposely used philosophical tools in order to advance theological arguments, clearly mirroring the Abelardian school but also more broadly shaping scholastic methodology which will become undoubtedly marked by both Neo-Platonism(s) and Aristotelianism.

Peter’s third argument also exposes his Augustinian roots. He argues that substance, substantia, is composed of equal elements, namely body and spirit (form and matter). Yet, demonstrating a Porphyrian dichotomy (notice the ontological hierarchy), Peter argues that spirit is ontologically better then body. Hence, he argues, it is better to be a spirit than a body, yet even better to be that which made the spirit, namely God the creator.[3] This argument heavily exposes Peter’s Augustinianism and Porphyrian Neo-Platonic philosophical roots. In embracing a higher ontological status for spirit than body, Peter is able to correlate spirit with a closer relation to the divine along a hierarchy of beings. In addition, this argument clearly represents a typically Neo-Platonic understanding of matter and demonstrates the absence of Aristotelian hylomorphism yet to arrive in Western Europe’s philosophical theology until the thirteenth century.(Also implying that the first and second arguments are probably more geared toward a recollection of forms.)

Finally, Peter’s fourth argument is perhaps his most philosophically interesting. He argues that the intellect is capable of distinguishing between two types of intelligibility. First, the mind is capable of perceiving that which exists empirically, through the aggressive investigation of ratio. Second, the mind is also capable of perceiving that which is spiritual and universal through the intellect’s ability to (recall) form from matter. Yet, Peter argues, that which is perceived as universal is preferable over that which is perceived as particular and temporal. We see this, as all Augustinians would argue, most easily in the human person which is both body and form, together spiritual and empirical. Hence, we can argue that a person can be at one time beautiful and at another imperfect, and flawed. However, the only way in which we can imagine a person as beautiful and yet flawed is to have a foreknowledge of that which is pure beauty and not flawed, something in which we judge the materially beautiful. Yet, such a being could not have matter, or it would be said to be flawed. Hence, one must conclude that there is a being that is both perfect and beautiful, yet not in a body, and it is this being that we call God.[4]

From the above arguments for the existence of God, we can conclude the following of Peter’s philosophical theology. For Peter, God is capable of being known through reason and philosophy, purposely embracing well known philosophical arguments that reflect knowledge of secular (ancient) philosophy, a clear mark of what will become scholasticism. Moreover, Peter believes that philosophy can demonstrate that God can be known as singular, simple, and lacking accidental qualities.[5] Furthermore, Peter demonstrates the willingness and ability to use analogical reasoning to have knowledge of God. From perpetuity of creatures, the Creator must be eternal, from greatness in creatures, God must be all-powerful, from order and disposition, God is wise, from governance over things, God is good and just. Through this analogous reasoning, Peter again demonstrates a natural theology that embraces tradition, nature, and secular philosophy and sets the stage for further analysis and implementation of analogical reasoning to be developed and refined in later scholasticism.

We began our discussion by saying that the mark of scholasticism is the “intellectual penetration of the faith, the systematization of the texts upon which the faith is based, and dialogue with non-Christian thought.”[6] From exposing Peter’s particular argumentation for the existence of God we can rightfully conclude that he meets such a definition. Peter Lombard fields a theological and philosophical paradigm that has as its basis, Holy Scripture and Christian tradition. Yet, he also prioritizes a vital role for philosophical reasoning and natural theology. In so doing, Peter reflects a third way in methodology. Using the Augustinian philosophy and theology of the Victorines, Peter clearly reflects content indebted to Hugh of St. Victor. Using the new topical systematization of Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard demonstrates the serious scholarship of the newly formed professional theologians. Yet, in borrowing from both schools and forging his own methodology and content, Peter develops his own seminal paradigm. While he was tremendously influenced by Augustinianism, his unique systematization in construction, as well as his own argumentation is clearly visible in his Libri Quattuor Sententiarum. The vitality and genius of his work is demonstrated most profoundly in his theological and philosophical legacy, the well over fourteen hundred commentaries on his work. And in such a following, the influence of Peter Lombard is undeniable and his place among the leaders of scholastic philosophy and theology forever assured.



[1] Lombard, Peter. Libri Quattuor Sententiarum. Iii.i.ii.

[2] Ibid. iii.i.iii.

[3] Ibid. iii.i.iv.

[4] Ibid. iii.i.v.

[5] Ibid. iii.i.vi.

[6] Grabmann, Martin. Geschichte der scholastischen Method. Vol. I, 62-63.


Here are some links to Peter Lombard's Sentences:


In Latin:

http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost12/PetrusLombardus/pet_s001.html

Partial English translation (a work in progress by the Franciscans):

http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/I-Sent.html


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