Tuesday, April 30, 2013

What is Ancient Greek Philosophy?

Many times I have been asked the question: What is Ancient Greek philosophy? In the same vein as the post on Kantian epistemology that everyone seems to enjoy I here present an easily digestible view of Pre-Socratic ancient Greek philosophy. Is it wise to reduce centuries of intricate philosophical thought into a few short paragraphs? Probably not, but hopefully I keep out of enough trouble to make it work.

            One modern characteristic of many historians of philosophy is the desire to look back upon previous philosophical ages with an eye toward any particular unifying features that can readily mark a specific age. The goal of such an approach to the history of philosophy is to be able to abstract the essence of thought being discussed at a particular time in history so as to provide a gateway into the issues of concern for people long ago deceased. Its process requires that the minutia must be past over for the generic, the all encompassing for the unique. This general descriptive manner of examining the history of philosophy can be helpful for the overall digestion of a large period of philosophical thought. However, this all encompassing approach to a given period of history can lead to an oversimplification of thought and a harmonizing of belief. It is tempting to look back upon the history of philosophy and to examine in it from the present something which it itself never would have claimed for itself. Here the temptation is to read into a specific age a common motif, presupposition, or argumentative goal that seems to transcend specific personalities. But such a reading of history can lead to a prescriptive lens of viewing the past instead of the descriptive lens that is needed. The historian of philosophy must not reinvent the past, but allow the past to determine itself. This is a difficult task. I do not presume to have mastered it, nor even anything close to it. However, it is a warning that I believe is too many times left off from these sorts of exercises. In my experience ideas, and especially people, are always more complicated than we first think, perhaps most especially when we think they are simple or in this case, their ideas to be archaic.

            It is with this caution that I now turn to an examination of Pre-Scoratic Greek philosophy. Here we can properly ask are there any descriptive common motifs that arise from individuals and form a common “Greek” philosophy? Or, are the personalities too disparate, too varied in philosophy and in time that any characterization of “Greek” philosophy quickly turns into a caricature of Greek philosophy? To begin to answer these questions, I will briefly examine three major philosophical movements that occurred in the Greek-influenced context, probing one major representative for each movement. In the end, I believe that we will make evident that there are a selective few common motifs that characterize these Greek philosophers, yet that any broad understanding of “Greek” philosophy is flawed if it does not take into account not only similarities, but perhaps more importantly, their many differences.
 Heraclitus: Physical Change and the Cosmos
           An Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus is typically considered the “weeping philosopher,” referring to his physical infirmities and his deep and unsettling philosophical prose. Heraclitus is most famous for his belief that the world was in a state of complete flux, stated famously as “It is not possible to step twice into the same river.” Seemingly, Heraclitus took the world to be as it presented itself to the senses and as the entirety of the material cosmos. Furthermore, given that the cosmos seems to be in complete disarray, it would make sense to postulate that everything was in flux. However, this belief only makes sense if you first ask the question: what is the principle by which the cosmos operate? What is the world? Here in answering this question Heraclitus looks for an all-encompassing principle that can account for the reality of the world as present to the senses. For this reason, Heraclitus answers that “This world-order did none of the gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.”  What is important to note in this statement is not so much the explicit content, although it is important and will have influence over Plato, but rather the presupposition it holds, namely that there is a singular principle by which the entire cosmos can be explained. Here we can see Heraclitus as searching for a singular explanation for the manner in which the world presents itself, as posing the question of reality and locating it within a singular principle.

            Moreover, Heraclitus presents a philosophy that has its core an appreciation of a basis for knowledge for which all are able to use and employ. He writes, “For although all things happen according to this Logos, men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is…although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding.” Here it is important to note several interesting implications. First, Heraclitus presumes there is a universal, underlining truth in the world in which all people have access to, yet most ignore. This is interesting because it is a presupposition that will carry onward in much of Greek philosophy. Second, Heraclitus assumes that for the few that do understand this universal knowledge, they ought to use perception to find answers. “The things of which there is seeing and hearing and perception, these do I prefer.” Hence, for Heraclitus, the world of sensation provides the foundation for human knowledge.
           Finally, Heraclitus argues that individuals are subject to fate. He writes, “…all things happen by strife and necessity.” Here Heraclitus is discussing the complete flux of the cosmos and the world fire as encompassing the change of reality. For Heraclitus, the cosmos is a dark and changing place, one of constant flux, of ignorance, and of a disastrous fate. Yet, there is hope in Heraclitus as there is truth to be found through perception, and a principle by which humanity can know the cosmos.
Pythagoras: Abstraction from the Physical
           Pythagoras is typically, and rightfully, associated with mathematics and geometry; he is presented as a figure deeply concerned with numbers and formulas that might explain the physical world. This is indeed an important factor in Pythagoras’ thought, but its oversimplification can easily conceal a more important insight developed by Pythagoras, namely that through mathematical formulation one can abstract from the material causation of the world and understand the principles that lie behind it. Rather than staying with the merely perceivable, as we see in Heraclitus, Pythagoras takes the physical world and looks past it towards a ratio of geometric formulation in order to understand the truth of reality beyond just the strictly observed. It is for this reason that he is able to postulate areas of inquiry such as the salvation of souls, the notion of asceticism, and conception of body/soul, all of which could never be achieved in the physical philosophy of Heraclitus. Pythagoras presents a philosophy that is not satisfied with the changeableness of the world, but seeks the underlining reality within.
            Nevertheless, this does seem to have parallels in Heraclitus’ thought, which should not surprise us as Heraclitus was Pythagoras’ contemporary. Heraclitus too understood the cosmos to be holding a principle by which truth can be learned, just as Pythagoras looked to geometric principles to explain the form of all things. Pythagoras sets up the following analogy, “Life, he said, is like a festival; just as some come to the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, but the best come as spectators, so in life the slavish men go hunting for fame or gain, the philosophers for truth.” While Pythagoras does not explicitly use the term Logos, his philosophy nevertheless reflects a deep appreciation for truth and for the human mind’s ability to ascertain knowledge of the world that is not subjective, but available for all. Hence, we can derive several interesting philosophical presuppositions that naturally flow from Pythagoras’ philosophy. First, for Pythagoras there were geometrical principles that naturally flow out of the cosmos and allow the human mind to understand the reality of the changing world. Hence, for Pythagoras the changing world had principles by which it operated as a nature. Second, those principles were abstracted from the material cosmos; they were understood as embedded into the world, yet not identical with the world. Hence, while the material world operated under these deterministic principles, the principles themselves were not isolated to the material world.
 Protagoras: Sophism and the Beginning of Socratic Dialogues
            We find in the Sophist movement an interesting moment in the history of philosophy. With the sophists we see influence of the pre-Socratics, yet foreshadowing of the Socratic dialogues to come. Hence, in Protagoras we can see the influence of the Pre-Socratics, yet also the coming of something new. Protagoras is famous for his saying that “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.” This has been interpreted by Plato, and much of the tradition, generally as a position of relativism, which if understood as a statement affirming that all knowledge is subjective, then such an interpretation would be valid. Yet, more interesting than his apparent relativism is that he does seems to believe in knowledge and the human mind’s ability to achieve it. For he writes, “About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.” There are several interesting components to this understanding of knowledge. First, even though Protagoras does not seem to believe that gaining knowledge is easy, he does posit something which is knowledge, and hence the possibility of knowing. Second, he postulates the “obscurity of the subject” as a reason for not knowing whether the gods exist. Here Protagoras seems to be aware of the limitations of some knowledge, and hence a criteria in which to adjudicate beliefs. While he does not set forth what such criteria might look like, he implies that such criteria must exist.

What is Greek Philosophy?

            We began this article with the questions, are there any descriptive common motifs that arise from individuals and form a common “Greek” philosophy? Or, are the personalities too disparate, too varied in philosophy and in time that any characterization of “Greek” philosophy quickly turns into a caricature of Greek philosophy? Now we can preliminarily provide an answer. There are several characteristics that seem to repeat themselves in the above philosophies and point toward a common theme among Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. First, Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy tends to share a common presupposition that there exists an intelligible world in which the senses have some access to, and by which knowledge (even if limited severely) is somewhat possible. We see this in Heraclitus in his understanding, even if a bit cryptic, of the Logos. “…although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding,” Heraclitus laments. In other words, there is knowledge out there to be had, if only the will of the person to achieve it. We see this also in Pythagoras as through mathematical formulation, which is universally applicable, the changeable world is able to be understood and properly articulated. Even in Protagoras, who often is understood as a pure relativist, still presumes that this knowledge, even if the criterion for that knowledge is subjective to the person, exists and is knowable. Hence, we can rightfully conclude that for the Pre-Socratics, there was a basis for knowledge that was accessible for the human mind, derived through principles, and typically restricted to those who were willing to achieve it. Second, the Pre-Socratics believed that there was a reality that existed in the material world and isolated to it. While the criterion for judging what that reality consisted of, in terms of its principles, varied among philosophers, the idea that there was in fact a reality, and that it was materially composed, remained. Even in the most staunchly limiting philosophies, such as Gorgias or Heraclitus, there remained something which could be articulated, a reality by which something could be said to exist, even if all that could be said was that it was incomprehensible. Hence, while the reality itself was contested, what was not contested was that there was a reality.

            Yet, this is not to argue that Pre-Socratic philosophy agreed on everything. As seen above, there are remarkable differences between these philosophies. While for Pythagoras the stability of the world allowed for geometrical certainty, for Heraclitus such a postulation was unfounded, as the world was always in flux. Moreover, while for Heraclitus the world was deducible to a Logos by which knowledge was tested, for Protagoras humanity was the judge by which knowledge was tested. Hence, we must conclude that while it is possible to speak of particular “Greek” Pre-Socratic themes, it must be recognized that there are just as many, if not many more, disagreements.

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

A New Religious Pluralism? Let's Hope Not

I have elsewhere discussed the failures of a weak ecumenism which slides into pluralism. Here is an excerpt from my review of Diana Eck's book, "A New Religious America."


However, on the other hand, the presupposition that religious pluralism (advocated by Eck), as understood as a level playing field of truth in all religions, leads to the neglect of real, tangible differences in propositional statements of reality. There are in fact very real, philosophical and theological differences between orthodox (and yes, even liberal) Christianity and that of Hinduism, Buddhism and the Abrahamic faiths of Islam and Judaism. These differences in articulating what each position believes is reality should not be held at arms length or tossed aside for the sake of a new "American pluralism." To do such would be a detrimental activity to both sides of the discussion, it would be to undermine the belief systems of both religions in dialogue. One need not reduce the world’s religious differences to societal context, nor rationalize them away as needless obstacles to inclusion, in order to engage in interreligious dialogue, nor to have fruitful exchange of ideas, even where both parties vigorously disagree. Pluralism, especially the one advocated here, attempts to equate religions as having the same ontological status of each other, as merely different, yet equal, approaches to the one reality, as if these differences are not really differences. This pluralism ignores the real, tangible differences on both sides of the religious divide. On purely logical grounds (I'm not necessarily advocating this myself, but on a purely logical level) a stronger pluralism would recognize those differences and instead of rationalizing them as obstacles that need to be removed, rather embrace them as real differences, ones that do not have to cease in order to have dialogue. Would such a pluralism still be a pluralism or would that enter the realm of what we loosely and vacuously call ecumenism? I do not know, and here I am not interested in that. Rather, in this particular case I argue against Eck who encourages a religious pluralism that is a ghastly combination and mixing of different religions (the image of America as the great melting pot should come to mind here). If this doesn't disgust you, then you probably aren't a member of one of those religions, in which case why do you care? As someone invested in a religion I know that true dialogue must at the least include the defining parameters of each religion in discussion, and only then can one have fruitful exchange of ideas. To empty the real, tangible differences of each religion and prop up what is left as a representation of a religious enterprise does neither side any good.

Can you imagine having a political debate with your friend on the other side of the political spectrum and telling him or her that what she really believes doesn't matter, what truly matters is only the few superficial things you and they agree on? Your friend would be right in pointing out your utter arrogance, if not your out right naivety. Why, then, would we expect that of all things on the planet, something as important and controversial as religion would be something where such gutting of beliefs could occur? The proclamation of truth on both sides of the religious divide should be articulated and not shied away from. A religious position void of the truth on which it believes it stands loses any significance. And from this position, truth is lost in the attempt at unity in the midst of diversity, where those who seek unity drown out diversity in their very attempt at inclusion. In reality what Eck is actually arguing for is the creation of a new religion, the great American Religion.

There really is nothing quite as exclusivist as a pluralist demanding inclusion is there?

Thursday, April 04, 2013

Gay Marriage and the Catholic Church

I direct your attention to a well written article on the subject. Please read it, I have had enough of people arguing that the Church ought to stay out of the gay marriage debate.

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/blog/why-the-catholic-church-and-gay-marriage-cannot-coexist/

Tuesday, April 02, 2013

O Analytical Thomism, Where Art Thou?

           I am often very skeptical of Analytical Thomism. This is not because I believe that Thomism cannot or should not engage itself in the unique problems of analytic philosophy. Rather, I believe that if such a project is accomplished the correct way it can lead to tremendous insights. My critique is that it has yet to really do so.
I have written elsewhere on the major characteristics of this field of Thomism. Here I will simply bullet point a few of them.
  • Either a rejection of non-analytical interpretations and applications of Thomism, or an unfamiliarity with the broader Thomistic field prior to G.E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach.
  • An interest in Thomas the philosopher, and not Thomas the theologian. (This may be changing, but by and large still there)
  • A deemphasis of the historical enviroment of Thomas and his contemporaries and engagement with his texts without the aid of historical studies or the tradition of interpretation.
  • An emphasis on Thomas as purely Aristotelian and a downplay of his Neo-Platonic influence. (Hence, a more Suarzeian reading of his texts)
  • Application of his texts into distinctly contemporary problems of analytic philosophy (yes, epistemology) with great attention to his use of the copula.
  • A silence in regards to his analogia entis, ontology in general, and especially the esse commune.
  •  
There seems to be two major problems with this approach to Thomistic studies. First, in removing the commentary that has built up around the Thomistic texts for the last eight hundred years the Thomistic texts are almost presumed to sit in a philosophical  and theological vacuum. This is problematic on two levels. While it is possible to retrieve a historical text “naively” or without attention to the historicity that has developed around it, it certainly is unadvisable. The notion of a pure return to the sources presumes a state of neutrality which is unwise on purely scholarly grounds.  Would we study Abraham Lincoln without knowing he was a Republican or from the West and Illinois? On the second level to neglect the scholarship that has developed around the texts is to be deprived of advances in previously unresolved problems, attention to newly discovered information, and a general awareness of historical context. We see the result of this neglect in the problem of esse. For example take Analytical Thomist Brian Davies and his argument that existence is not a predicate.[1] Or take Anthony Kenny who without any reference to the scholarship that has developed for centuries around the interpretation of esse was free to dismiss it as superfluous nonsense while Davies was free to interpret esse in Thomas as an attribute in the sense of A. J. Ayer, instead of Thomas’ historical position of esse as an act. 
     The second problem with the presuppositions of this version of Thomism is its unfamiliarity with and lack of interest in the historical Thomas. Perhaps the most severe criticism of Analytical Thomism, it seems a fairly justifiable one. In this regard, the most disturbing element of this Thomism is that it seems fixated only on the present, particularly on present analytical philosophical concerns, leaving the historical Thomas barely utilized. In this regard, this Thomism is at a disadvantage when it comes to recent work on the Neo-Platonic influences in Thomas’ work, the controversial nature of using Aristotelian philosophy at the time, his place among his own contemporaries, and his role as a theologian. There is something extraordinarily unhistorical about a Thomism which has no use for his theology. In a section entitled “not without theology,” while discussing Analytical Thomism’s lack of interest in his theology Fergus Kerr notes, “But, though these are philosophical considerations, the options that he [Thomas] adopted have a significant bearing on his theology and the spirituality inscribed in his theology.”[2]  For the historical Thomas there was no separation between good philosophy and good theology. “In short, epistemology is not separable from theology.”[3] Due to the complete dominance of the present, these vital components of Thomistic research are almost completely neglected. This is not a criticism of placing Thomas in dialogue with analytical problems; it is a criticism of only doing that without the needed historical awareness in which that dialogue can be brought to fruition.
     
     For all these reasons we can see why Analytical Thomism has a tendency to gravitate toward an accommodationalism. Similarly to Transcendental Thomism, this Thomism has even less interest in the historical Thomas. The use of the historical Thomas is practically non-existent in Analytical Thomism’s texts. Instead, this version of Thomism insists on the priority of contemporary analytical problems to dominate philosophy. This version of Thomism can have a tremendous impact if it avoides some of its current pitfalls. But atleast for now, it has a lot of work to do before it can garner the respect of many Thomist scholars outside of its own very limited purview.


                [1] Brian Davies, “Aquinas, God and Being,” The Monist 80 (1997): 500-520. Also see Brian J. Shanley’s rebuttal: “Analytic Thomism,” The Thomist 63 (1999): 125-137.
                [2] Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, 32.
                [3] Ibid., 33.