Two Worlds Meet: Martin Heidegger and Thomas Aquinas

Here is a snippet of my new work:

To understand the Heideggerian place for Thomism is to first understand the place for Heidegger’s philosophy itself. Principle to the early Heidegger’s project, to which this work is intentionally limited, is the discerning role of Destruktion. In Sein und Zeit [SZ], Heidegger aims to tear down the edifice of being, a concept contorted by the rust and corrosion of the Western normative tradition. The wrestling away of being from those who would keep it hidden is, in an important way, a stripping of the future by those who would seek to determine it [das Man]. The consequential result is that Dasein must take control of itself, it must in a way, become master of its own self so as to make a clearing [Lichtung] for disclosedness. In this way we are to be offered a glimpse into being. The order here is significant. It is through the existential analytic of Dasein that we peek into the hidden contours of being, it is not through being that we peek into the hiddenness of Man. For Heidegger, the stake of philosophy is not finally anthropology, but ontology. This has been obscured by those, especially the “children of Heidegger,” whom in their excitement for the existential analytic obscure the very understanding which stands center to the entire Heideggerian project. Thus, do we now have, in a precisely Heideggerian way, a contemporary obscurity of Dasein, ironically produced by those who have proclaimed Dasein the loudest.

What is being for The History of Ontology? Here Heidegger is instructive. It is the actus ens, the individual instances of being. The primordial grounding upon which any ens is given understanding is a nonsensical question to our history. Or at least so we are told. From Aristotle onward, Heidegger teaches, the drowning of being under the auspices of individualized ens results ultimately in a metaphysically-retarded nominalism that, in its rare logically consistent form, substitutes the ego for being. The disaster of English strict empiricism and the embarrassment of Continental occasionalism are merely symptoms of the larger disease of alienation, of separating the human person from the larger question of being. In short, we have forgotten how to think. We must learn anew how to think, and consequently, what to think on. We have stayed too long in the wilderness, we have substituted temporality for time, Being for being, Dasein for ego. This is the “onto-theo-logical” tradition.

So we turn back to the method of Destruktion. It is only by a process of clearing away that we can find a place and space for Lichtung, that is, for the illuminating light to find its way through the clearing. This is not always a pleasant experience, purification, even intellectual purification, is painful. There has been a tendency in some circles to belittle the pain involved in Destruktion, this is a mistake. There is a tearing down component to Destruktion that must occur if we are truly to seek out the unrealized potentiality of Dasein. How could it be any other way?

The reverse is also false. Heidegger does not teach anything so obstinate as to create rubble so as to create something entirely new out from its ashes. The equiprimordiality of temporality necessitates the threefold unity of historicality, contemporaneity and possibility. The critical-historical assessment of the past is a wrestling loose of non-contemporaneity, precisely so that it may impact contemporaneity.  This is not blindness to the historical; it is the only way in which we see the historical as historical. This is an appreciation for the past as past, as non-contemporaneity. There is a criticism to be laid bare against Heidegger in terms of his larger use of the temporal unity, but I have done so elsewhere and is irrelevant to our aim.

What, then, is the Heideggerian place for Thomism? Heidegger places Thomas Aquinas as representative of the apex of scholastic ontology, of the fruition of Aristotelian ontology and the turning point that led to the Cartesian esse as res cogitans. To Heidegger, Thomas is another causal-ontological-philosopher which hangs on to the ens understanding of being. Is this true? Is Thomas merely the greatest of the ens philosophers?

The Council of Nicea and Power

“Hi XXX, sorry about that, my reply was aimed at a response to XXX, but I must have hit the wrong button. Nevertheless, I enjoyed reading your response. I find your questions regarding the Council of Nicea quite justified, and I have asked them as well. All Councils, especially Nicea, were deeply imbedded into the political landscape of the time. You might already know this but when Constantine called for the Council of Nicea he was intending to have the bishops give him full authority of Church doctrine. In the end the bishops not only rejected that, they even told him (the most powerful man in the world) that the Church has the right to question the state! Talk about guts. The major politics at work at Nicea was who had authority over the Church? The emperor or the bishops? The Council once and for all said not only is Christ the head of the Church, but that the Church was independent of the state and had the right to rebuke it. Was there infighting between the bishops (over power, turf, etc), of course, and you are right in pointing that out. Nevertheless, I am constantly humbled by the fact that God seems to bring forth good out of people who seem to me the least capable of it. If that happens in my little world, how much more good could God bring about at the most important council in Church history? God can use us, even despite ourselves.”

Max Scheler: Person as Bearer of Values

          Max Scheler in his work, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, broadly attempts to unearth phenomenological insights from the human person with special attention to values. One of the larger projects of Scheler’s phenomenological examination of the human person is to understand how the person is constituted as that which is a bearer of values. It is here where Scheler believes the phenomenon of the person can be disclosed through intuition. From this position he is able to begin an analysis of values and preference that isolates the primordial person as a bearer of values with possibilities for concern, that is, the ability to allow value preference to lead to choice and direct one’s formal values. Rejecting the material values of Nietzsche (as well as Umwertung aller Wert) and the formal values of Kant, Scheler wants to develop a middle ground that holds both material values and formal values as intrinsically correlated in the person who is constituted by both experience and acts, yet governed by universal and necessary values. The question that will be raised must be, is it possible for Scheler to advance a truly phenomenological appropriation of the person, which requires the phenomenon (and hence for Scheler not the existential) to dictate the terms of inquiry, and at the same time present a middle ground between the formal values of Kant and the material values of Nietzsche without yielding to ontology? In answering this question it will become apparent that although Scheler desires a phenomenological approach to the human person his postulations require ontology.
          Values never occur in isolation, they are always in relation to other values. In other words, in the disclosing of values one does not merely intuit an instantiation of a singular value, but rather a world of values that form a vertical transcendence of the person. However, the question arises, how are these values disclosed to persons? Here Scheler wants to hold a middle position, namely, holding together the noumenon with the phenomenon. In this regard, Scheler wants to reject both a Kantian nameless abstraction and a form of substantialism and instead offer up a phenomenological approach that accounts for subjectivity and the unity of act-essences. For this reason, he recognizes that part of the process of forming values is subjective, varies from culture to culture, and generation to generation, yet still, he argues, can present a normative experience that highlights a given reality which truly exists. In this way it is possible to describe various societies and cultures as holding different values, for example as being more hedonistic, or more utilitarian. But, nevertheless these subjective and culturally accepted social values are not enough for an ethics which intends to get beyond a nameless noumenon and instead offer up a positive approach to the human person. As Julius Bixler notes, for Scheler “We must first know what good and bad are in themselves, not in their social setting but in their nature…” Scheler writes, “For ethics does not try to make understandable what is considered good and evil according to social validity; rather, it seeks to make understandable what good and evil are.” In other words, it is not enough for ethics to merely present social validity based on a culture based system-program of values, but rather must be able to articulate a legitimate hierarchy, or order to values.
          This interesting component of Scheler’s personalism, namely his commitment to a hierarchy of values, is the most difficult for him to prove given his sole commitment to phenomenology. Yet it is fundamental to his system as a whole. As Perrin writes, “The hierarchy of values is itself absolutely invariable, while the order of preference in history is itself variable.” Hence, Scheler does not wish to diminish historicality or the subjective role in values, but rather counterbalance it with an appeal to an a priori order. The hierarchy of values inherently implies an order of rank that is on the noumenon side, but is disclosed through the phenomenon. Scheler writes, “The most important and most fundamental a priori relations obtain as an order of ranks among the systems of qualities of non-formal values which we call value-modalities.” Hence, these value-modalities form an inherent hierarchy which enables value systems to be evaluated and determined as higher or lower. But, given that values are disclosed to persons, who as Scheler recognizes are subjective, what are the criteria in which to adjudicate the a priori order of values once they are instantiated into the social order?
          Scheler argues that there are five criteria, or modalities, for determining the respective merits of competing values. The first criterion for determining the merit of a value is to test for its permanence, that is, for its value over time. Here Scheler gives us a typical scenario in which he believes the longevity of a value can be disclosed easily. “If, he asserts, I affirm my love for someone, I do not qualify my testament by saying ‘I love you now’ or otherwise indicate that this love is momentary. Rather, the notion of duration is conveyed in the affirmation itself. And if I find at some point that this love is gone, I must conclude that I misunderstood and misstated my original sentiment, that I never really loved this person.” In this criterion, Scheler is able to thematize the person as intrinsically tied to values that are transtemporal, as seeking values that do not remain on the level of the fleeting, but on the level of permanence. The second criterion for adjudicating competing values is the extent to which a value is diminished or consumed in its various expressions and manifestations. In this criterion, a value can be understood as higher the less it is able to be divisible among the individuals that participate in it. An example of this type of value would be beauty, as beauty is never lessened by the amount of individual things which participate in it.
          The third criterion for adjudicating values is when the “value is higher the less it is dependent upon the existence of another value for its own worth.” Here the criterion is whether the value itself is universal enough that it is not isolated to particulars. An easy example would be a tool which only has value because it was designed to serve. In other words, just as a tool is used for a means to something else, a high value would be the end value itself, not merely a means to another value. The fourth criterion is the quality of satisfaction in the value. Here Scheler does not have in mind merely a utilitarian sense of pleasure versus pain, but a fulfillment of experience, a sense of purpose. It is this criterion, more than any other, that Scheler’s interpretation of values opens up to claims of subjectivism. What is a sense of fulfillment but a subjective experience that varies from person to person? Here Scheler seems to anticipate the subjectivist critiques by arguing that these criteria are merely the phenomenological intimations of a much deeper lying principle. However, it seems a legitimate critique to pose the question of what is the difference between Kant’s nameless X and Scheler’s ‘phenomenological intimations?’ We will explore Scheler’s Kantian problem in fuller detail below.
         Finally, the fifth criterion for adjudicating between competing values is the higher the value is on the hierarchy, the less relative it is in value. It is important to note here that Scheler is not using the term relative is subjectivist meaning, but instead is using it as a term that expressing a dependence within some values. In other words, relative values rely in a subject for their meaning, as in the values of nobility, vulgarity, etc. In contrast to relative values, absolute values are not contingent upon a subject but instead completely valuable of its own merit.
          After articulating the criteria in which the hierarchy of values can be adjudicated, Scheler separates values into two levels. On the lowest level of values are those which are sensible, namely, pleasure, pain, enjoyment, and suffering. “These values appear in sensuous feeling. The entire class of values is ‘relative’ to beings of a sensuous nature.” Just above the modality of the sensible, Scheler places the modality of life, namely, health, disease, vigor, joy, grievances, etc. Moreover, by separating these two levels of values Scheler directly rejects hedonism and utilitarianism. By placing a higher value on life, as opposed to the sensuous feelings that are derived from that life, Scheler rejects a value system which prioritizes usefulness. For Scheler, the error that utilitarianism commits is the conflation of life values to sensible values. In other words, life is more than the sum of preferences and desires toward pleasure and the avoidance of pain and suffering. Here we can see an important feature of Scheler’s personalism, namely that the lower values, that is, pleasure, pain and suffering are only a derivative of the person. Nevertheless, both modalities are values that are still correlates to a person and hence are not absolute.
          In explicating the absolute and highest values on the hierarchy, Scheler presents the modalities of the spiritual and the holy. Spiritual values do not necessarily require an ego or a body. Nevertheless, in spiritual feelings there must be a recipient, some subject in which the spiritual values are disclosed. It is here where the person is disclosed, a person who is psycho-physically indifferent and hence opposed to any form of reduction of the person to an ego and the corresponding Cartesian dualism. Furthermore, it is here in these higher values that the person will be disclosed as receiving values which transcend time, place and context, and instead reach into the very pure and absolute hierarchy of values itself.
          After presenting the value hierarchy, Scheler is able to then formulate the person, as one who is neither a noumenon nor a subjectivist phenomenon. For Scheler this was the biggest error of Kant. In Kant, the person-in-itself falls into the noumenon and only the intelligibility of the phenomenon remained as cognitively available for appreciation. Hence, for Kant, the person functioned merely as a logical tool, as a postulation of something which has been reduced to a homo logos or homo noumenon. Instead, for Scheler, to “locate the person, we must look beyond every experience which is manifest or apparent to us towards the being which is having that experience.” Nevertheless, this understanding of person reveals a major problem in Scheler’s phenomenological articulation of the human person. As Perrin puts it, “by locating the person at the centre of all acts of valuation, Scheler honours Kant’s dictum that, as neither substance nor thing, the Person can never be treated as an object without doing violence to its elemental nature.” Here we can reveal the problem that Scheler leaves unaddressed, namely the requirement of an ‘elemental nature,’ and a unity of experience, yet no ontological framework in which to ground that phenomenological insight into reality. In other words, Scheler is unable to escape his own critique of Kant, as without engaging in any ontological commitments, and outright rejecting ‘substantialism,’ the outcome of Scheler’s personalism slides into a Kantian noumenological namelessness of the X, or a subjectivist bundle of experience-acts which have no suppositum in which to be grounded.
          Scheler does have a role for essences, but they are always limited to individuals. Scheler writes,

Essence, as we mentioned earlier, has nothing to do with universality. An essence of an intuitive nature is the foundation of both general concepts and intentions directed to particulars. It is only when we refer an essence to an object of observation (“the essence of something”) and inductive experience that the intention through which this reference occurs because something that pertains to either a universal or a particular. Therefore there are essences that are only given in one particular individual. And, for this very reason it makes good sense to speak of an individual essence and also the individual value-essence of a person.

However, as demonstrated above, Scheler does not believe that the person is merely the sum total of one’s acts. The individual essence of a person is necessarily an ontological statement about the qualitative necessity of a being in whose experiences are realized. Hence, Scheler writes, “It is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities, and gifts into its object, because they belong to that individual person.” Note that for Scheler it is not the acts of the person which substantiate the person, but that they belong to a person. Nevertheless there remains a major problem: how can Scheler appeal to an ontological status of a being in which such a value-essence is grounded?
          The argument we began with was that Max Scheler presents a phenomenological appreciation of the human person, yet in so doing cannot escape his own criticism of a Kantian subjectivism where the person is eradicated into a homo noumenon. The personalism of Scheler has no room for ontology and metaphysics, yet requires it for his own postulations. However, this is not to say that a preliminary and foundational theory of ontology is not already embedded into the presuppositions of Scheler’s own philosophy. Rather, much of his own work is threaded with ontological and metaphysical presuppositions that are either unrecognized or minimized in attempt to thematize and prioritize the phenomenological.
         Nevertheless, Without an appreciation for the ontological grounding of reality, there will be no escape from Kant. Hence, Scheler’s personalism necessitates an exploration into the existential component of the human person, not merely the phenomenological. And this can be accomplished with the work of Martin Heidegger.

What is Ancient Greek Philosophy?

Many times I have been asked the question: What is Ancient Greek philosophy? In the same vein as the post on Kantian epistemology that everyone seems to enjoy I here present an easily digestible view of Pre-Socratic ancient Greek philosophy. Is it wise to reduce centuries of intricate philosophical thought into a few short paragraphs? Probably not, but hopefully I keep out of enough trouble to make it work.

            One modern characteristic of many historians of philosophy is the desire to look back upon previous philosophical ages with an eye toward any particular unifying features that can readily mark a specific age. The goal of such an approach to the history of philosophy is to be able to abstract the essence of thought being discussed at a particular time in history so as to provide a gateway into the issues of concern for people long ago deceased. Its process requires that the minutia must be past over for the generic, the all encompassing for the unique. This general descriptive manner of examining the history of philosophy can be helpful for the overall digestion of a large period of philosophical thought. However, this all encompassing approach to a given period of history can lead to an oversimplification of thought and a harmonizing of belief. It is tempting to look back upon the history of philosophy and to examine in it from the present something which it itself never would have claimed for itself. Here the temptation is to read into a specific age a common motif, presupposition, or argumentative goal that seems to transcend specific personalities. But such a reading of history can lead to a prescriptive lens of viewing the past instead of the descriptive lens that is needed. The historian of philosophy must not reinvent the past, but allow the past to determine itself. This is a difficult task. I do not presume to have mastered it, nor even anything close to it. However, it is a warning that I believe is too many times left off from these sorts of exercises. In my experience ideas, and especially people, are always more complicated than we first think, perhaps most especially when we think they are simple or in this case, their ideas to be archaic.

            It is with this caution that I now turn to an examination of Pre-Scoratic Greek philosophy. Here we can properly ask are there any descriptive common motifs that arise from individuals and form a common “Greek” philosophy? Or, are the personalities too disparate, too varied in philosophy and in time that any characterization of “Greek” philosophy quickly turns into a caricature of Greek philosophy? To begin to answer these questions, I will briefly examine three major philosophical movements that occurred in the Greek-influenced context, probing one major representative for each movement. In the end, I believe that we will make evident that there are a selective few common motifs that characterize these Greek philosophers, yet that any broad understanding of “Greek” philosophy is flawed if it does not take into account not only similarities, but perhaps more importantly, their many differences.

 Heraclitus: Physical Change and the Cosmos

           An Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus is typically considered the “weeping philosopher,” referring to his physical infirmities and his deep and unsettling philosophical prose. Heraclitus is most famous for his belief that the world was in a state of complete flux, stated famously as “It is not possible to step twice into the same river.” Seemingly, Heraclitus took the world to be as it presented itself to the senses and as the entirety of the material cosmos. Furthermore, given that the cosmos seems to be in complete disarray, it would make sense to postulate that everything was in flux. However, this belief only makes sense if you first ask the question: what is the principle by which the cosmos operate? What is the world? Here in answering this question Heraclitus looks for an all-encompassing principle that can account for the reality of the world as present to the senses. For this reason, Heraclitus answers that “This world-order did none of the gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and going out in measures.”  What is important to note in this statement is not so much the explicit content, although it is important and will have influence over Plato, but rather the presupposition it holds, namely that there is a singular principle by which the entire cosmos can be explained. Here we can see Heraclitus as searching for a singular explanation for the manner in which the world presents itself, as posing the question of reality and locating it within a singular principle.

            Moreover, Heraclitus presents a philosophy that has its core an appreciation of a basis for knowledge for which all are able to use and employ. He writes, “For although all things happen according to this Logos, men are like people of no experience, even when they experience such words and deeds as I explain, when I distinguish each thing according to its constitution and declare how it is…although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding.” Here it is important to note several interesting implications. First, Heraclitus presumes there is a universal, underlining truth in the world in which all people have access to, yet most ignore. This is interesting because it is a presupposition that will carry onward in much of Greek philosophy. Second, Heraclitus assumes that for the few that do understand this universal knowledge, they ought to use perception to find answers. “The things of which there is seeing and hearing and perception, these do I prefer.” Hence, for Heraclitus, the world of sensation provides the foundation for human knowledge.

           Finally, Heraclitus argues that individuals are subject to fate. He writes, “…all things happen by strife and necessity.” Here Heraclitus is discussing the complete flux of the cosmos and the world fire as encompassing the change of reality. For Heraclitus, the cosmos is a dark and changing place, one of constant flux, of ignorance, and of a disastrous fate. Yet, there is hope in Heraclitus as there is truth to be found through perception, and a principle by which humanity can know the cosmos.

Pythagoras: Abstraction from the Physical

           Pythagoras is typically, and rightfully, associated with mathematics and geometry; he is presented as a figure deeply concerned with numbers and formulas that might explain the physical world. This is indeed an important factor in Pythagoras’ thought, but its oversimplification can easily conceal a more important insight developed by Pythagoras, namely that through mathematical formulation one can abstract from the material causation of the world and understand the principles that lie behind it. Rather than staying with the merely perceivable, as we see in Heraclitus, Pythagoras takes the physical world and looks past it towards a ratio of geometric formulation in order to understand the truth of reality beyond just the strictly observed. It is for this reason that he is able to postulate areas of inquiry such as the salvation of souls, the notion of asceticism, and conception of body/soul, all of which could never be achieved in the physical philosophy of Heraclitus. Pythagoras presents a philosophy that is not satisfied with the changeableness of the world, but seeks the underlining reality within.

            Nevertheless, this does seem to have parallels in Heraclitus’ thought, which should not surprise us as Heraclitus was Pythagoras’ contemporary. Heraclitus too understood the cosmos to be holding a principle by which truth can be learned, just as Pythagoras looked to geometric principles to explain the form of all things. Pythagoras sets up the following analogy, “Life, he said, is like a festival; just as some come to the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, but the best come as spectators, so in life the slavish men go hunting for fame or gain, the philosophers for truth.” While Pythagoras does not explicitly use the term Logos, his philosophy nevertheless reflects a deep appreciation for truth and for the human mind’s ability to ascertain knowledge of the world that is not subjective, but available for all. Hence, we can derive several interesting philosophical presuppositions that naturally flow from Pythagoras’ philosophy. First, for Pythagoras there were geometrical principles that naturally flow out of the cosmos and allow the human mind to understand the reality of the changing world. Hence, for Pythagoras the changing world had principles by which it operated as a nature. Second, those principles were abstracted from the material cosmos; they were understood as embedded into the world, yet not identical with the world. Hence, while the material world operated under these deterministic principles, the principles themselves were not isolated to the material world.

 Protagoras: Sophism and the Beginning of Socratic Dialogues

            We find in the Sophist movement an interesting moment in the history of philosophy. With the sophists we see influence of the pre-Socratics, yet foreshadowing of the Socratic dialogues to come. Hence, in Protagoras we can see the influence of the Pre-Socratics, yet also the coming of something new. Protagoras is famous for his saying that “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.” This has been interpreted by Plato, and much of the tradition, generally as a position of relativism, which if understood as a statement affirming that all knowledge is subjective, then such an interpretation would be valid. Yet, more interesting than his apparent relativism is that he does seems to believe in knowledge and the human mind’s ability to achieve it. For he writes, “About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity of the subject, and the shortness of human life.” There are several interesting components to this understanding of knowledge. First, even though Protagoras does not seem to believe that gaining knowledge is easy, he does posit something which is knowledge, and hence the possibility of knowing. Second, he postulates the “obscurity of the subject” as a reason for not knowing whether the gods exist. Here Protagoras seems to be aware of the limitations of some knowledge, and hence a criteria in which to adjudicate beliefs. While he does not set forth what such criteria might look like, he implies that such criteria must exist.

What is Greek Philosophy?

            We began this article with the questions, are there any descriptive common motifs that arise from individuals and form a common “Greek” philosophy? Or, are the personalities too disparate, too varied in philosophy and in time that any characterization of “Greek” philosophy quickly turns into a caricature of Greek philosophy? Now we can preliminarily provide an answer. There are several characteristics that seem to repeat themselves in the above philosophies and point toward a common theme among Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. First, Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy tends to share a common presupposition that there exists an intelligible world in which the senses have some access to, and by which knowledge (even if limited severely) is somewhat possible. We see this in Heraclitus in his understanding, even if a bit cryptic, of the Logos. “…although the Logos is common the many live as though they had a private understanding,” Heraclitus laments. In other words, there is knowledge out there to be had, if only the will of the person to achieve it. We see this also in Pythagoras as through mathematical formulation, which is universally applicable, the changeable world is able to be understood and properly articulated. Even in Protagoras, who often is understood as a pure relativist, still presumes that this knowledge, even if the criterion for that knowledge is subjective to the person, exists and is knowable. Hence, we can rightfully conclude that for the Pre-Socratics, there was a basis for knowledge that was accessible for the human mind, derived through principles, and typically restricted to those who were willing to achieve it. Second, the Pre-Socratics believed that there was a reality that existed in the material world and isolated to it. While the criterion for judging what that reality consisted of, in terms of its principles, varied among philosophers, the idea that there was in fact a reality, and that it was materially composed, remained. Even in the most staunchly limiting philosophies, such as Gorgias or Heraclitus, there remained something which could be articulated, a reality by which something could be said to exist, even if all that could be said was that it was incomprehensible. Hence, while the reality itself was contested, what was not contested was that there was a reality.

            Yet, this is not to argue that Pre-Socratic philosophy agreed on everything. As seen above, there are remarkable differences between these philosophies. While for Pythagoras the stability of the world allowed for geometrical certainty, for Heraclitus such a postulation was unfounded, as the world was always in flux. Moreover, while for Heraclitus the world was deducible to a Logos by which knowledge was tested, for Protagoras humanity was the judge by which knowledge was tested. Hence, we must conclude that while it is possible to speak of particular “Greek” Pre-Socratic themes, it must be recognized that there are just as many, if not many more, disagreements.

A New Religious Pluralism? Let's Hope Not

I have elsewhere discussed the failures of a weak ecumenism which slides into pluralism. Here is an excerpt from my review of Diana Eck's book, "A New Religious America."


However, on the other hand, the presupposition that religious pluralism (advocated by Eck), as understood as a level playing field of truth in all religions, leads to the neglect of real, tangible differences in propositional statements of reality. There are in fact very real, philosophical and theological differences between orthodox (and yes, even liberal) Christianity and that of Hinduism, Buddhism and the Abrahamic faiths of Islam and Judaism. These differences in articulating what each position believes is reality should not be held at arms length or tossed aside for the sake of a new "American pluralism." To do such would be a detrimental activity to both sides of the discussion, it would be to undermine the belief systems of both religions in dialogue. One need not reduce the world’s religious differences to societal context, nor rationalize them away as needless obstacles to inclusion, in order to engage in interreligious dialogue, nor to have fruitful exchange of ideas, even where both parties vigorously disagree. Pluralism, especially the one advocated here, attempts to equate religions as having the same ontological status of each other, as merely different, yet equal, approaches to the one reality, as if these differences are not really differences. This pluralism ignores the real, tangible differences on both sides of the religious divide. On purely logical grounds (I'm not necessarily advocating this myself, but on a purely logical level) a stronger pluralism would recognize those differences and instead of rationalizing them as obstacles that need to be removed, rather embrace them as real differences, ones that do not have to cease in order to have dialogue. Would such a pluralism still be a pluralism or would that enter the realm of what we loosely and vacuously call ecumenism? I do not know, and here I am not interested in that. Rather, in this particular case I argue against Eck who encourages a religious pluralism that is a ghastly combination and mixing of different religions (the image of America as the great melting pot should come to mind here). If this doesn't disgust you, then you probably aren't a member of one of those religions, in which case why do you care? As someone invested in a religion I know that true dialogue must at the least include the defining parameters of each religion in discussion, and only then can one have fruitful exchange of ideas. To empty the real, tangible differences of each religion and prop up what is left as a representation of a religious enterprise does neither side any good.

Can you imagine having a political debate with your friend on the other side of the political spectrum and telling him or her that what she really believes doesn't matter, what truly matters is only the few superficial things you and they agree on? Your friend would be right in pointing out your utter arrogance, if not your out right naivety. Why, then, would we expect that of all things on the planet, something as important and controversial as religion would be something where such gutting of beliefs could occur? The proclamation of truth on both sides of the religious divide should be articulated and not shied away from. A religious position void of the truth on which it believes it stands loses any significance. And from this position, truth is lost in the attempt at unity in the midst of diversity, where those who seek unity drown out diversity in their very attempt at inclusion. In reality what Eck is actually arguing for is the creation of a new religion, the great American Religion.

There really is nothing quite as exclusivist as a pluralist demanding inclusion is there?

Gay Marriage and the Catholic Church

I direct your attention to a well written article on the subject. Please read it, I have had enough of people arguing that the Church ought to stay out of the gay marriage debate.

http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/blog/why-the-catholic-church-and-gay-marriage-cannot-coexist/

O Analytical Thomism, Where Art Thou?

           I am often very skeptical of Analytical Thomism. This is not because I believe that Thomism cannot or should not engage itself in the unique problems of analytic philosophy. Rather, I believe that if such a project is accomplished the correct way it can lead to tremendous insights. My critique is that it has yet to really do so.

I have written elsewhere on the major characteristics of this field of Thomism. Here I will simply bullet point a few of them.

• Either a rejection of non-analytical interpretations and applications of Thomism, or an unfamiliarity with the broader Thomistic field prior to G.E.M. Anscombe and Peter Geach.
• An interest in Thomas the philosopher, and not Thomas the theologian. (This may be changing, but by and large still there)
• A deemphasis of the historical enviroment of Thomas and his contemporaries and engagement with his texts without the aid of historical studies or the tradition of interpretation.
• An emphasis on Thomas as purely Aristotelian and a downplay of his Neo-Platonic influence. (Hence, a more Suarzeian reading of his texts)
• Application of his texts into distinctly contemporary problems of analytic philosophy (yes, epistemology) with great attention to his use of the copula.
• A silence in regards to his analogia entis, ontology in general, and especially the esse commune.
 

There seems to be two major problems with this approach to Thomistic studies. First, in removing the commentary that has built up around the Thomistic texts for the last eight hundred years the Thomistic texts are almost presumed to sit in a philosophical  and theological vacuum. This is problematic on two levels. While it is possible to retrieve a historical text “naively” or without attention to the historicity that has developed around it, it certainly is unadvisable. The notion of a pure return to the sources presumes a state of neutrality which is unwise on purely scholarly grounds.  Would we study Abraham Lincoln without knowing he was a Republican or from the West and Illinois? On the second level to neglect the scholarship that has developed around the texts is to be deprived of advances in previously unresolved problems, attention to newly discovered information, and a general awareness of historical context. We see the result of this neglect in the problem of esse. For example take Analytical Thomist Brian Davies and his argument that existence is not a predicate.[1] Or take Anthony Kenny who without any reference to the scholarship that has developed for centuries around the interpretation of esse was free to dismiss it as superfluous nonsense while Davies was free to interpret esse in Thomas as an attribute in the sense of A. J. Ayer, instead of Thomas’ historical position of esse as an act. 

     The second problem with the presuppositions of this version of Thomism is its unfamiliarity with and lack of interest in the historical Thomas. Perhaps the most severe criticism of Analytical Thomism, it seems a fairly justifiable one. In this regard, the most disturbing element of this Thomism is that it seems fixated only on the present, particularly on present analytical philosophical concerns, leaving the historical Thomas barely utilized. In this regard, this Thomism is at a disadvantage when it comes to recent work on the Neo-Platonic influences in Thomas’ work, the controversial nature of using Aristotelian philosophy at the time, his place among his own contemporaries, and his role as a theologian. There is something extraordinarily unhistorical about a Thomism which has no use for his theology. In a section entitled “not without theology,” while discussing Analytical Thomism’s lack of interest in his theology Fergus Kerr notes, “But, though these are philosophical considerations, the options that he [Thomas] adopted have a significant bearing on his theology and the spirituality inscribed in his theology.”[2]  For the historical Thomas there was no separation between good philosophy and good theology. “In short, epistemology is not separable from theology.”[3] Due to the complete dominance of the present, these vital components of Thomistic research are almost completely neglected. This is not a criticism of placing Thomas in dialogue with analytical problems; it is a criticism of only doing that without the needed historical awareness in which that dialogue can be brought to fruition.
     
     For all these reasons we can see why Analytical Thomism has a tendency to gravitate toward an accommodationalism. Similarly to Transcendental Thomism, this Thomism has even less interest in the historical Thomas. The use of the historical Thomas is practically non-existent in Analytical Thomism’s texts. Instead, this version of Thomism insists on the priority of contemporary analytical problems to dominate philosophy. This version of Thomism can have a tremendous impact if it avoides some of its current pitfalls. But atleast for now, it has a lot of work to do before it can garner the respect of many Thomist scholars outside of its own very limited purview.

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                [1] Brian Davies, “Aquinas, God and Being,” The Monist 80 (1997): 500-520. Also see Brian J. Shanley’s rebuttal: “Analytic Thomism,” The Thomist 63 (1999): 125-137.

                [2] Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism, 32.

                [3] Ibid., 33.

Hegel's Aesthetics

“The beauty of nature is beautiful only for another, i.e. for us, for it is the mind which apprehends beauty.” – Hegel[1]

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                [1] G.W.F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts, [Fine Arts] Vol. 1, translated by T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) pg. 123.

Ever existing within a hierarchical structure, for Hegel, beauty “begins as the beauty of nature.”[1] But what does it mean for beauty to begin in nature? For Hegel, the Concept is thrust completely and objectively into the brute material world. “The Concept immediately sinks itself so completely in objectivity that it does not itself appear as subjective ideal unity; on the contrary, it has altogether passed over soullessly into the material world perceived by the senses.” In this way, it is best to understand Hegel’s understanding of nature as the bottom level of Ideality, the material and complete objectivity of Idea. Here we can understand Hegel’s panlogism as the sinking of the Logos into nature. As Schwegler writes, “Nature is a Bacchantic God, uncontrolled by, and unconscious of, himself. It offers, then, no example of an intelligibly articulated, continuously ascendant gradation. On the contrary, it everywhere mingles and confounds the essential limits by intermediate and spurious products which perpetually furnishes instances in contradiction of every fixed classification.”[2]

On the extreme bottom level of this brute materiality we find purely mechanical and physical bodies which lack the complete articulation of the Concept. One particular characteristic of these bodies is their lack of animation and, similarly, their lack of parts. Hegel notes, “A metal, for example, is in itself a manifold of mechanical and physical qualities; but every tiny part of it possesses them in the same way.”[3] Moving upward along the natural hierarchy of bodies, Hegel places those higher natural objects which exist completely independently, yet come together into a system. Here Hegel has in mind the example of the solar system, with the sun existing entirely with itself, yet in relation to other bodies forming a complete system. “The sun, comets, moons, and planets appear, on the one hand, as heavenly bodies independent and different from one another; but on the other hand, they are what they are only because of the determinate place they occupy in a total system of bodies.”[4] Finally, third, we see the most Ideal form of natural existence, namely that of life. “Dead, inorganic nature is not adequate to the Idea, and only the living organism is an actuality of the Idea.”[5] Moreover, Hegel gives three qualifications for how this ought to be understood. First, in organic unity that is living, the Concept is manifested as something real; second, there is a negation of the real in it being subject to the Concept; and third, there is an infinite form which has the ability and power to maintain itself in organic content.[6]
The best and most ideal manifestation is found in human life. In the human person, the idea of the body and the idea of the soul are unified and indentified in a deep and negated manner. The body is animated by the soul in a manner where the body and its members exist as the systematic articulation of the Concept. In the body, the universal and the particular are articulated in unity. Hegel writes, “…so life too is to be known only as the unity of soul with its body. The subjective as well as the substantial unity of the soul within the body itself is displayed…”[7] In the human person, the singular self is articulated in unity with the body. Hegel presents an interesting argument for this mediation by appealing to the natural ability to feel or be touched. “It [physical feeling] permeates every member, is all over the organism in hundreds and hundreds of places, and yet in the same organism there are not many thousands of feelers; there is only one self that feels.”[8] This is an interesting insight into the unity that is found in the human person. It demonstrates, for Hegel, the unity that is found in the body and the soul. Hence, the Concept clearly manifests itself in a more perfect manner in the human than can be found in lower natural objects.

 It is here, in Hegel’s appreciation of the unity of the human person that we begin to discover his role for natural aesthetics. Hegel writes, “…life in nature is beautiful because truth, the Idea in its earliest natural form as life, is immediately present there in an individual and adequate actuality.”[9] This is interesting because in this passage Hegel explicitly ties together the idea of the beautiful to the notion of truth. Hegel argues that beauty in nature is understood in relation to a mind which can apprehend beauty. In this sense, beauty is something apprehended by a mind which can appreciate the appearance of the beautiful. “The beauty of nature is beautiful only for another, i.e. for us, for the mind which apprehends beauty.”[10] Nevertheless, this type of beauty, because it is material, (and not a creation for Hegel) is not produced to be beautiful, but merely appears beautiful to the mind. He writes, “Yet, because of this purely sensuous immediacy, the living beauty of nature is produced neither for nor out of itself as beautiful and for the sake of a beautiful appearance.”[11] In this regard, natural beauty, for Hegel, will never raise to the aesthetical value we find in fine art, which has its sole existence as dependent upon its creation to be beautiful.

Similar to beauty requiring a relation to a mind, Hegel argues that from this perspective, at least for natural things, beauty is not within the natural object itself, but merely the subjective consideration of the object. In this way, Hegel envisions the apprehension of the beautiful in nature as the cognitive consideration of the object as beautiful. Hence, we see Hegel trying to avoid two polar opposites. In arguing that beauty in natural objects is found in the mind’s apprehension, that is, it’s guiding thought of an object, he avoids presenting an aesthetics which is purely perception based.[12] A perception based aesthetics would have to admit either an intrinsic beauty to the natural object (which would violate Hegel’s view of nature as brute objective materiality) or he would have to admit beauty was unrelated to ideality, but mere sense appreciation (which would violate Hegel’s idealism as well as his notion of the human person as united soul and body). Hegel explains that nature displays “…the Concept and the Idea, [which] is to be called beautiful; this is because when we look at natural forms that accord with the Concept, such a correspondence with the Concept is foreshadowed; and when we examine them with our senses the inner necessity and the harmony of the whole articulation is revealed to them at the same time. The perception of nature as beautiful goes no further than this foreshadowing of the Concept.” [13]This is the best nature can provide for aesthetics. In holding natural objects up against the idea of the beautiful, the mind is able to appreciate nature as beautiful.

Nevertheless, what accounts for even this appreciation of the beautiful? Here Hegel articulates the beautiful as that which is harmonious. Hegel writes, “The form of natural beauty as an abstract form…regulates the external manifold in accordance with this its determinacy and unity which, however, does not become imposed on the external. This sort of form is what is called regularity and symmetry, then conformity to law, and finally harmony.”[14] It is not important for our discussion to go into detail over regularity, symmetry, or conformity to law, however it will prove helpful to uncover more about how Hegel understands harmony.

Hegel defines harmony as “…a relation of qualitative differences, and indeed of a totality of such differences, a totality grounded in the essence of the thing itself.”[15] In other words, Hegel argues that the qualitative differences of a particular sensuous material assert themselves as a “congruous unity” which demonstrates itself in all its particularity, yet united into a congruous whole. It is this congruity which is harmony. The united whole of all the particularities of the natural object present a pleasing whole which compliments each other. Here Hegel gives the example of the human person, in the “case with harmony of the human figure, its position, rest, movement etc. Here no difference may come forward one-sidedly by itself, or otherwise the harmony is disturbed.”[16] It is in the interplay between the particularity of a natural object’s qualitative differences and the essence of the thing itself which accounts for harmony.

Finally, it is necessary to conclude with an analysis of what Hegel understands to be the deficiency of natural beauty. Hegel problematizes such deficiency aptly in his question, “why is nature necessarily imperfect in its beauty, and what is the origin of this imperfection?”[17] Ultimately the answer to this question will include the fact that the beauty of art is a reality more adequate to the Idea of beauty, but why?

Hegel argues that the Idea is always instantiated into a complete subjective individuality.[18] In the natural world this is realized through what he calls, immediate natural objects, that is, particularized objects of life. Hegel argues that humans represent the highest spiritual form of immediate natural objects, as the human person has an inner life which is projected through their physical manifestation.[19] Nevertheless, even in the human person there are three reasons for why there is a deficiency within natural beauty that is reconciled in the aesthetics of art. First, Hegel argues that nature is limited by its very materiality, more specifically, through an individual necessarily participating in its species. Hegel notes, “Every single animal belongs to a determinate and therefore restricted and fixed species, beyond the limits of which it cannot step.”[20] Here Hegel seemingly argues that the limitedness of belonging to a species somehow limits the “vision of independence” that is a requisite for genuine beauty. Yet, it must be said that this argument, as presented in its specific form, leaves much to be desired. One might ask, why does the existence of species have an inverse relationship on freedom? It would seem the only manner in which such an inverse relationship could occur would be within a view of freedom which is libertarian based, a view seemingly at odds with other comments Hegel makes on freedom.

The second argument for why natural beauty is less than the genuine beauty found in art is based on the physicality of the human person. Within the human person, Hegel notes that humans present their negative and impoverished feelings manifest in a very physical manner as they age and go through life’s unpleasant experiences. Hegel writes, “So there are worn faces on which all the passions have left the imprint of their destructive fiery; others afford only the impression of their inner coldness and superficiality; others again are so singular that the general type of features has almost entirely disappeared.”[21] The major thrust of Hegel’s argument here seems to be that these negative effects of the passions onto the human person reflect an “inherently unfree particularity.” Similar to the above argument, it is hard to make logical sense of Hegel’s argument, nor is it that convincing. One might ask again, why does the mere fact that the passions intertwine with the human person’s materiality speak to limitedness in freedom? Especially given that, as he argues, all ideality is particularized and that it is actually spiritually good that there is a substantial unity between body and soul.

The third argument Hegel puts forward is based on the finiteness of life. Hegel writes, “For the Concept, and, more concretely still, the Idea, is inherently infinite and free.”[22] Here the juxtaposition is between animality which is finite, and Idea which is infinity and freedom. This argument, I think, best articulates the driving force behind the critique that runs through all his arguments. For Hegel, the finiteness of human life or of life in general, is by definition a limiting force on spirit. The Concept is manifested in the natural world, but in a very limited and unfree manner. The limitedness of space and temporality shackles the infinite and free desire for the spirit, and hence no natural object can ever live up to the beauty we find in a subjective creation such as fine art. For Hegel, fine art represents freedom and infiniteness in its best and truest form. It owes its existence purely for the sake of beauty. It is a physical or musical representation of the inter-subjectivity of the self, disclosing spirit out of the limitedness of the person. In its creation, it presents itself juxtaposed to natural objects as rising above them, expressing a more primordial freedom in which the spirit finds its more natural home. For Hegel, this could never occur in the realm of natural objects, they are too restricted in their materiality, and lack the inter-subjective play shown in the creation of art.

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                [1] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg. 116.

               

                [2] Albert Schwegler, A History of Philosophy, translated by Julius Seelye, (Stockton, CA: University Press of the Pacific, 2010) pg. 332. Also see: Edward Douglas Fawcett, “From Berkeley to Hegel,” The Monist 7 (October, 1896): 41-81.

                [3] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg.  116.

               

                [4] Ibid, pg. 117.

               

                [5] Ibid, pg. 118.

               

                [6] Ibid.

 

                [7] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg. 119.

               

                [8] Ibid.

               

                [9] Ibid, pg. 123.

 

                [10] Ibid.

 

                [11] Ibid.

                [12] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg. 128.

               

                [13] Ibid, pg. 130.

                [14] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg.134.

               

                [15] Hegel, pg. 140.

               

                [16] Hegel, pg. 141.

               

                [17] Hegel, pg. 143.

               

                [18] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg. 143.

               

                [19] “The skin is not hidden by plant-like unloving coverings; the pulsating of the blood shows itself over the entire surface; the beating heart of life is as it were present everywhere over the body and comes out into appearance externally as the body’s own animation, as turgor vitae, as this swelling life.” Ibid, pg. 146.

               

                [20] Ibid, pg. 150.

               

                [21] Hegel, Fine Arts, pg. 151.

               

                [22] Ibid.