Pythagorean Quote

Life is like a festival; just as some come to the festival to compete, some to ply their trade, but the best come as spectators, so in life the slavish men go hunting for fame or gain, the philosophers for truth.
---Pythagoras

Antony Flew, Atheism

In his article, “Theology and Falsification,” Antony Flew poses a question that asks what is required for someone to disprove the existence of God. The basis, or foundation, of such a question is formulated in his belief that to know the meaning of the negation of an assertion is to know the positive meaning of the assertion. He forms this qualification on the back of a previous belief, namely, that “to assert that such and such is the case is necessarily equivalent to denying that such and such is not the case.” Yet, one must ask the question, what is the relationship between the belief of the person asserting and the assertion itself? But for now, to a certain extent, we must say that Flew is correct. When someone asserts that they live in Paris, France, and it became known that in fact, they had actually lived in London, England, then we would say that the assertion, they live in Paris, France was one of two things: either they never lived in Paris, in which case they lied (Flew), or they recently moved from Paris, in which case the assertion, while once true, no longer ceases to be true (Nietzsche). Now, Flew would have us believe that in the case of the existence of God, when we say such an assertion, we necessarily rule out the assertion there is no God. While this is undoubtedly true, it is not the same as our above assertion that someone who lives Paris actually does not live in Paris, as to disprove God’s existence would require evidence unavailable to us. If we were to disprove the assertion that someone lives in Paris we would go to the facts, we would look up names in a telephone book, perhaps investigate on the internet. But when we set out to disprove the existence of God, we no longer have easily reachable tools at our discretion that target the belief. Instead, we use what is at hand, perhaps an argument from the problem of evil, as Flew does in his article. But in asserting an argument against God, such as the problem of evil, we have to ask, what actually have we refuted? Have we refuted belief in God, or simply an understanding of God, which may or may not be accurate? The death by a thousand qualifications (which is supposed to lead us to a type of evidentialist agnosticism) says less about our belief in God, and says more about the one attempting to understand, through analogy, an understanding of God. Would we say that belief in evolution also dies the death of a thousand qualifications when we explain why certain features (which seemingly have no usage) still remain in certain animals, or would we simply say that our understanding of evolution is ever growing, ever changing? Or, perhaps, qualifications of something are only a problem when the object of study is not empirically verifiable, and thus the evidence not scientifically determined? If so, once again, the problem is not qualification, but the criterion for adjudicating justified true belief, in which case Flew should hardly be surprised that any positive ontological statement of God dies the death of a thousand qualifications when thrown into the logical positivist’s waste bucket. Rather, the very complexity of God requires such a distinction. It seems Flew makes a conflation, namely belief in and understanding of. Disproving an understanding of says nothing of its belief in. This is not to say that there is no relationship between understanding and belief, rather there must be if we are indeed reasonable creatures. Yet, the relationship between them is not like a balloon tethered to a pole, where if only we cut loose an understanding of God, the whole notion of God floats away. Rather, if those qualifications about God are correct (and Flew presents no reason why they should not be), then we should not be surprised that cutting away at understandings of God is like Sisyphus eternally pushing his boulder, it’s a process of eternal frustration with no purpose. Or, is Flew right, and ought we to stop believing in evolution because our understanding of it has led to a thousand qualifications?

Luther and The Foundation of Protestantism

"Respondeo non ut Aristoteles: Cytharisando fit bonus cytharaedus, bene operando fit bonus, iuste faciendo fit iuste. Haec enim valent foro physico et mundo, sed non apud Deum. Nam coram Deo in hac nostra corrupta natura nemo fit iustus iuste agendo, sed iustus a Deo pronunciatus iusta facit et bene operando operatur."

Here is the part about Luther's justification bringing righteousness. But notice it is only after we have been declared righteous by God, we have done nothing ourselves. This needs to be seen as a direct assault against the Church's position that we are sacramentally imbued with an indeliable mark. Moreover, there is no change in the person via declaration, the change is "in alio ad caelum" or assumed in heaven. This needs to be seen as an assault on the Church's position that there is also a visible Church, not merely an invisible Church. Here we can see the foundation forming of Protestantism's complete individualism, lack of sacramental change, lack of salvific participation, and rejection of habitual virtues (i.e. virtues that are natural and not supernatural). Its a house of cards, you take down the bottom the whole thing collapses.

DiNoia, Postmodern Thomism and its Failures

DiNoia finds several interesting roles for the existence of God which intend to remove the typical rejections they receive from typically modern critiques, such as the Kantian undercutting of metaphysics. DiNoia argues that one role for traditional arguments, which can be found even in Thomas Aquinas and his “Five Ways,” is that these arguments should be understood as internal expressions of the ecclesial life, and not as rigid apologetics that ought to be used to combat modern critiques. For example, Thomas’ “Five Ways,” are not merely apologetic but also, “Rather, such arguments function to locate Christian worship, nurture, practice, and belief on the widest possible conceptual map: the God who is adored, proclaimed, and confessed in the Christian Church is none other than the cause of the world.” Hence, DiNoia places the Thomistic arguments for God in what we might now call an existential horizon, as an internal expression of concepts that bring to life the internal world of the liturgy to the real world of causality. Another role that traditional arguments for the existence of God can have, according to DiNoia, is also found in Thomas’ work, namely his use of analogical relations. The appeal of such relations, as I understand it, is that it uses a semantic framework which no longer speaks in what is perceived as univocal and absolute language (although this seems to be a caricature of medieval thought), and instead embraces a more nuanced approach that keeps in mind the limitless gulf between created and creator, and hence between object and subject. One can see the appeal of this to a postmodern audience, as it directly appeases a hermeneutical horizon that seeks a larger role for enculturation and subjectivity, and distresses the more ontological and objective role of arguments. With this said, one can still ask the question, is this “postmodern-friendly” role for Thomas’ arguments really what Thomas himself had in mind? If not, and I think there is good reason to question if it is, then using postmodernism’s own caution for the subjective context of place and situation, one would assume that such a re-appropriation of Thomas’ work undercuts his own historicality and neglects the very subjectivity that such a postmodern approach seeks to preserve.

Existence and Essence

An important element of Thomistic metaphysics is the role of existence and essence. Within creatures there is a distinction which must be made between existence and essence. However for God, his essence is his existence. This is important to note because many theological and philosophical errors have derived from a failure to recognize these two distinctions.

First, within creatures existence and essence cannot be convertible. Every material substance, (spiritual substances differ slightly) is the combination of a substantial form and matter. Hence, each individual material substance has an individuating principle, namely matter, and a universal quiddity which provides its nature, namely its substantial form. This is required for twofold reasons which are relevant for our discussion. First, a substantial form provides a material substance with its nature, providing its regular functions and its limitations. Second, a substantial form actualizes primary matter, yet secondary matter still remains which leaves open possibilities for the material substance to change. Hence, this hylomorphic understanding of material substances allows for the necessity of all things to change. Moreover, this change is only possible because the secondary matter which exists in the material substance, allowing for the potential of a substantial change. This can only occur if within material substances, both existence and essence are not convertible. If existence and essence were convertible within created material substances, then there would be no change possible within substances. In other words, we would be left with a complete monism, not unlike Spinoza. This is obviously in error because it cannot account for a plurality of beings or substantial change, nor ultimately the distinction between creator and created. Hence, from the above we can conclude that in material substances there is a real distinction between essence and existence.

Second, within God, his essence must be his existence. According to Thomas, God is that which necessarily is. Moreover, if that which is was different than his existence, than that essence would be in variance with his existence, as in a quality which is in variance with its substance. However this is impossible in God, because that would create a division with the Godhead, which is a logical impossibility as that which necessarily is, is also necessarily one. In other words, if God has an essence which was different than his existence, then there would be a division in God between what he is and that he is. Moreover, this division has several repercussions that lead to error. First, such a division would mean that God’s essence was dependent upon his existence, which would mean that within God was something dependent, not pure actuality. Second, such a division would mean that God’s essence was something superadded to his existence, and hence something would need to be posited outside of God which can then can add into God his essence, which is a clear absurdity. Third, if there was a division between God’s essence and existence, it would mean that there could be change within God. As I mentioned above, the reason that material substances can change is because there is a separation between our existence and essence, which can account for a potentiality to be something other than we are. However, if this was also the case with God, it would mean that God had a potentiality to be something other than he is, in which case he could also change who he is to be something else. This is obviously absurd, as it violates the principle that God is pure act, changeless and perfect. Finally and ultimately, if God’s essence and existence were different, we would logically have to posit a God above God. This is because if God had potentiality and thus not pure act, we would have to ask the question, where did God get his potentiality from, except from that which is pure act and which can have no distinctions? Hence, from the above, there can be no distinction between existence and essence in God.

Heidegger vs Thomas Aquinas

Martin Heidegger in his Marburg lectures, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, broadly attempts to trace phenomenology through the history of philosophy. Through the course of Heidegger’s search for phenomenology (with an emphasis on ontology) within the philosophical tradition he analyzes Thomas Aquinas’ determination of truth laid forth in De veritate. Heidegger principally examines the first question, articles 1-3 and 9 in attempt to demonstrate that Thomas laid the groundwork for the later Cartesian belief that the primordial grounding of truth is located in the res cogitans. It is the Thomistic understanding of truth which, according to Heidegger, leads the philosophical tradition toward the individualist appropriation of ontology that we find in modernity. Hence, my research consists of Heidegger’s specific argument against Thomas in his commentary on De veritate, as well as the ramifications of such an interpretation among the broader scholarly dialogue that has been developing between Thomas Aquinas and Heidegger. The thesis of this work consists of a critique of the Heideggerian interpretation of Thomas in his commentary on De veritate, question 1, articles 1-3 and 9. Moreover, this work has a twofold aim, namely to draw out the potential Heideggerian misinterpretation of Thomas’ determination of truth within De veritate, as well as situating such an argument within the larger scope of the interpenetrating dialogue of Thomistic and Heideggerian ontology. The audience of such a work are those interested in a potential dialogue between Thomism and Heideggerian ontology, a dialogue that exposes a latent misinterpretation on the part of Heidegger, yet not without the potential to expose possible commonalities.

Where in the creed does it call for liberalism or conservatism?

The two main streams of Christianity, liberalism and conservatism (whether Protestant or Catholic), both lead to heterodoxy if unbalanced by orthodoxy and tradition.

Conservatism must remember that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is not only his earthly words but just as equally his actions. Moreover, it was not suffering in itself that is salvific, but Jesus' commitment, obedience, and fidelity through it.

Liberalism must remember that what theology needs is a hermeneutics of faith, not merely a secular hermeneutics of the latest philosophical fad. Liberalism would do good to remember an old medieval limerick regarding how we ought to read scripture: Littera gesta docet, quid credas allegoria, moralis quid agas, quo tendas anagogia. "The letter speaks of deeds, allegory about the faith, the moral about our actions, analogy about our destiny." Let them not neglect our faith and our collective destiny.

The only way to avoid sliding into one extreme or the other is to strive for fidelity in our collective and historical faith. Through adhering to the tradition of our faith we find sustenance to continue onward amongst so many temptations to go astray. The beauty of our faith is that it is historical. It doesn't ask us to believe random notions created by the recent ideological sway in society, lacking any historical credibility like so many self-created religious groups of the last century. But, just as equally it demands of us to remain committed to action, not merely passive in reciting beliefs. It eternally calls us to become more than we are today, it does not allow us the comfort of complacency. The reason why our faith is able to do this is because of the history of countless saints who have come before us and blazed the path in which we follow. Either extreme of liberalism or conservatism neglects part of that historical faith. It either ignores our collective faith and destiny or it neglects our struggle for growth and action.

It does good to remember that the Church does not count time in decades, like our culture does, but in centuries. And we ought to remember that the historical Church is not liberal or conservative, rather it was, is and remains, one, holy, apostolic and catholic.

Heidegger, Husserl and Thomas Aquinas

The problem with Husserl and ultimately with Heidegger is not the lacking of Absolute Being, rather it is the starting point in knowing the Absolute. Where Husserl (and Heidegger) hide inward, Thomas Aquinas discovers outward among countless participants.

Outdated Versions of Thomism

Traditionally, there have been four recognizable sub-fields of Thomism. Typically they are:

Transcendental Thomism: Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan. These are your typical Neo-Kantians, they tend to be Cartesian dualists (subjectivists) and typically use Thomas in "creative manners," with little regard for the historical character of actual Thomism.

Analytical Thomism: Kretzmann, Stump. These are your philosophers who want to use the name of Thomas, and some of his ideas, to address issues within analytic philosophy.

Existential Thomism: Gilson, Maritain. These philosophers tend to be more influenced by continental philosophy, yet unlike the transcendentals are not "card carrying" Neo-Kantians. They want to use parts of Thomas for problems within continental philosophy.

Aristotelian Thomism: These are your philosophers who tend to emphasize the historical Thomas, as well as his reliance on Aristotelianism. These tend to be your medievalists, interested in history and ecclesial tradition.

Yet, I'm becoming more and more convinced that these are outdated models of Thomism. I would like to offer a more up to date divison of Thomism in the 21st century:


Fribourg (German) Thomism: These philosophers seem to have little regard for the historical problems that Thomas himself was interested in. They tend to read Thomas alone and neither apply it to contemporary issues or analyze the historical nexus of his work.

Angelicum Thomism: These philosophers tend to place all their interest in the historical Thomas. It tends to stress the originality of Thomas and underplays his Aristotelian reliance.

Pseudo-Analytical Thomism: These philosophers tend to give no credence whatsoever to the original Thomas and its historicality. It seems many times they merely pick and choose whatever suits their contemporary needs.

Finally, what I'm interested in

Historical and Contemporary Thomism: These philosophers merge the Angelicum thomism with the old existential thomism with modest results. I believe there is potential in this, but it needs to be broader. This type of Thomism needs to have the historical rigor of the Angelicum, but the agility to bring into discussion both existential thomism and a form of analytic philosophy. Both on their own tends to lead to ridiculous grandstanding to particular needs given to their respective philosophical stem (continental or analytic).

So using the old versions, you could say I want to merge all three camps, minus the transcendental thomists who I believe we can just ditch by the roadside. But if using this newer model, we need to ditch the pseudo-analytic thomism which seems to do nothing whatsoever in regards to what Thomas actually said, yet at the same time not ignore analytic problems. We need a thomism which is firmly rooted in the actual person of Thomas, yet with the ability to consistentantly and cogently speak to the continentals and analytics. Its a tough task, but it must be done. As it is now, Thomism is too fractured.

Commentary on The Old System-Program of German Idealism

Within continental philosophy there is a widespread reliance upon basic presuppositions of the human person that have their roots firmly planted in the soil of German Idealism. As with most things, this has both its positives and its negatives. It's benefits, perhaps, lie in the seriousness in which it takes any investigation of the human, fully aware of the psychological complexities of the mind and the limits of any real investigation into the self. Now, this is not to say that all German Idealism consists of is mere psychological brainteasers, frantically groping into the murky depths of the subconscious. Although, as with anything, there is some of that too. But to be fair to German Idealism, there are many brilliant and interesting discoveries made to bare, that perhaps are too often neglected, atleast in the English-speaking world. Nevertheless, to the point. What I present here is a summation of a brief treatise written by one of the so called "Tubingen Three," either Hegel, Schelling, or Hoderlin. (Although, it seems to me that its entirely possible it was a collaboration). No matter the author, it provides the general environment in which German Idealism flourished, and paints a colorful picture of what life ought to be like, if only we all became German Idealists. What follows is partly a summation and partly a presentation of their ideas. I leave it you to determine its validity, and whether it truly reflects reality.

***

One of the principle foundations on which German Idealism rests is Fichte’s famous statement, ‘I am I.’ Within such a principle, for Fichte, we can locate the primordial self-consciousness, the starting point on which idealism will be developed. Within this principle is located both the subject and the object, the “I think,” or the transcendental apprehension, and the unknown noumena or the objective ‘thing-in-itself.’ Hence, fittingly, Fichte explains such a principle as an intellectual intuition, a seeming oxymoron, yet yielding perfectly within Neo-Kantian structures. The absolute grounding of such a principle, for Fichte, was the absolute ego. Only from this primordial ground can we understand the subject, or partial ego and the object, or non-ego. Rejecting this absolute ego as the primordial grounding, Holderlin argues that there is a primordial split between the subject and object, one grounded not in an absolute ego as Fichte believed, but in an absolute ‘being.’ Where Fichte understood this primordial split of the absolute being between the partial ego and non-ego, Holderlin postulates that the split ought to be between subject and object, with being as the absolute. Furthermore, Schelling, disagreeing with Holderlin, postulates that the grounding of the absolute is only understood within identity, developing an identity philosophy. Hence, the primordial split between subject and object occurs under the elusive identity.

The natural question that underlies the progression of these perceptions of the self is how does one unify the subjective and the objective? Moreover, what philosophical discipline will allow for such seeming contrasting principles? After all, it was Schelling who dichotomized the subjective, with its freedom, spontaneity, ethics, goodness on one side and the objective, that is, determinism, necessity, physics, laws, and truth on the other. How ought the two be understood together, and thus recognizing the underlying absolute? For this, these philosophers provided the concept of beauty and aesthetics. Through the perception of beauty one can understand both the subjective and objective, the uniting of the good and the true. For example, in a painting, the subjective element is presented as a product of the self, yet the objective is revealed in its ability to objectify the self, to stand and observe the self-created as other than oneself. Hence, in their eyes, true philosophy must be poetic.

It is this philosophical aestheticism that is at work in The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism. There it is described how truth and goodness can be unified in the aesthetical act, “I am convinced that the highest act of reason (in containing all ideas) is an aesthetical act, and that Truth and Goodness are only related in Beauty – the philosopher must possess as much aesthetical power as the poet.” Under this understanding, the philosopher is not understood as a rigid logician, void of the power of the subjective, but rather ought to unite the primordial split through their commonality in beauty. This becomes in contrast to the professional philosophers, who have the ability to systematize and categorize ‘lower ideas,’ but can never understand the ‘higher dignity’ of the poet. “The human beings without an aesthetical sense are book-philosophers. The philosophy of the spirit is an aesthetic philosophy. One cannot be ingenious, one cannot even reason about history in an ingenious way, without aesthetical sense.” The test of philosophical worth becomes the ability to unite subject and object so as to recall the primordial self which is both.

Moreover, also curiously correlated with the notion of philosophy of poetics is the notion of the need for the mythological. Reason has been too cold and calculating, unaware of the beauty in which the primordial split can be united. Additionally, the goal of such a mythology is to provide an interest to everyday, average people who do not have the philosophical knowledge to arrive at these conclusions. Hence, beauty is turned into mythos, and mythos in turn becomes reasonable, thus correlating the average people to that which is beautiful in a manner suitable to their ability. “Until we make the ideas aesthetical, i.e. mythological, they will have no interest to the simple people – and vice versa…mythology has to become philosophical and the people reasonable, while philosophy has to become mythological in order to make the philosopher sensual.” The interesting dynamic at work is a direct resemblance of romanticism. Rejecting the perceived complete objectivity and superiority of the Enlightenment, these idealists call for a philosophy that matters to the people, to unite the philosophers with the common man. “Finally the enlightened and unenlightened must shake hands.” The rejection of a class of philosophers, as the uniting of the self, subject and object, would take precedence within the beautiful.

Another interesting aspect of this work is its replacement of the religious with the aesthetical and mythological. “Then eternal unity will rule among us. Never again the condescending look, and never again the trembling of the people before its sages and priests.” Where in the past, truth and goodness were dictated to the people by philosophers, or religion, according these idealists, once beauty has been mythologized it will finally replace the need for superstitious religious beliefs that hinder the uniting of the self. In this regard, the religion of the Church is supplanted by the religion of the beautiful. “A higher spirit, send from heaven, will have to be the founder of this new religion among us; it will be the last and great work of humanity.” These pseudo-religious overtones intentionally parallel aestheticism which had previously been dominated by the Church. It was after all the Church in which most of artwork had been created and sustained. It was also the Church and religion in which the aesthetical and the mythological were united in revealing a primordial truth. Hence, we can rightly claim that within this work, the new aesthetics, purely humanistic, and the new mythology, based upon such aesthetics, will be the new religion of the people, revealing a primordial truth. This truth for Schelling would be one’s identity, and for Holderlin this would be being itself. Overall, the goal of such is to recollect one’s true self, a self which has been split and needs to be united. It is not a coincidence that in doing so, these idealists purposely uses religious terminology. By pursuing a fundamental and primordial state of being, they are replacing the monotheism of Christianity, with the monotheism of “reason and heart.”

Is there room for Christianity in this picture? If so, how might it fit?