Is There Room For Tradition in Heidegger?

The Equiprimordial Unity of Temporality

A Critique of Heideggerian Existential Priority of the Future and an Appendage to the Threefold Temporality of Dasein



Introduction

“Temporality temporalizes as a future which makes present in the process of having been.” This foundational insight found in Heidegger’s seminal work Being and Time is the crux of a primordial temporal structure that unifies all three horizons of temporality. The Being in which such a primordial structure becomes meaningful, namely Dasein, is one that exists within such a structure. It is this temporal structure of Dasein which provides the threefold unity of its existence, namely its having been, its present and its futural possibilities. Each horizon of temporality represents a vital component of its existence, each required for the authentic moment of vision in which one realizes their possibilities for becoming more than they are. The reality of this insight, when expanded to its logical entailment, ought to explicitly describe equiprimordially the unity of temporality, an equal convergence of the three horizons of time, namely the having-been, the present and the future. And indeed Heidegger allows for such equiprimordial unity when he argues that “temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession.’ The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present.” The only logical conclusion to such a rejection of sequential ecstases is an entity which is “between birth and death [and] presents the whole which we have been seeking.” Hence, as an entity between birth and death, that is, a present in which there was a having-been but also a future as a Being-towards-death, Dasein stands as the true historical Being, equiprimordially justified in its threefold temporal convergence.
However, this seeming ‘interconnectedness’ of past, present, and future necessitates certain qualities of such a Being in which all three horizons are unified and made to bare. As such it will be this paper’s task to ask the question, is Heidegger consistent in his treatment of temporality as equiprimordial among the three horizons? In Being and Time does the past-self and the future-self really have an equal share in determining the present? As such, we will be examining Heidegger’s understanding of the threefold unity of temporality, with special attention to any priority of the future which inversely affects the having-been. After examining Heidegger’s position, I will conclude that his existential analytic of the threefold unity of temporality prioritizes the future-self to the detriment of the past and thus distorts the equiprimordial unity of the present. However, following Heidegger’s own undeniable insight, I will attempt to provide a clear path with a more equally unified structure of temporality, that is, in which the past and future are molded into the present. Such a path can prove not only more cogent as representative of our equiprimordality as Beings existing in threefold unity of temporality, but perhaps can also move Heidegger’s existential analytic of temporality to a more Heideggerian center in which the possibilities of the future are unconditionally grounded in a primordial having-been.

The Interconnectedness of Past, Present and Future

We begin by examining Heidegger’s intentionality with our attention toward the unity of temporality. It is undoubtedly Heidegger’s intention that all three horizons of temporality, which exposes the historicality of Dasein, be equiprimordial. In explicating the disclosedness of temporality (which we will examine below) he writes,
Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been’. All the same, one’s state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is making present. And all the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future.

In such a precise structure, Heidegger reveals his intention in uniting the threefold unity of temporality as equiprimordial and that the three horizons provide the framework for the temporalizing of temporality that is intrinsic to Dasein. Moreover, such interconnectedness provides the backbone for any futural possibilities that will so dominate Dasein’s existential and ontological make-up. It is only because of the having been that there are futural possibilities that are realized in the present. And, it is only because of futural possibilities that the having been becomes relevant in the present.
We can see this interdependency easily visible in understanding Dasein as an entity which is ‘between’ birth and death. In reflecting on his existential analytic so far Heidegger claims, “The connectedness of life in which Dasein somehow maintains itself constantly is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-whole.” The nature of Dasein is one that has as its fundamental existence in this threefold horizon of temporality. It is precisely because of the historicality of Dasein, and its possibilities for the future that require such an equiprimordial unity. If one horizon becomes more primordial than another, this delicate balance between the three horizons is disturbed and the unity of temporality broken. It is this intentionality, namely the equiprimordial unity of the threefold temporality that we will examine in attempt to judge whether Heidegger remains consistent.

The Disclosedness of Temporality and its Possibilities

The concrete temporal constitution of care, an authentic disclosedness of Dasein, involves a structure of understanding, mood, falling, and discourse. Particularly relevant to our discussion on the primordial unity between the three horizons of temporality is Heidegger’s structure of “understanding.” Understanding can be understood in a twofold manner, linguistically as an existentiale or as an ontological existential. The former prioritizes the Being of a ‘there’ in which “on the basis of such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of looking around, and of just looking.” While such an understanding is merely ontic, it is still important to note that under such a term, Dasein is given its factical ability in which the existential meaning can be elucidated.
In unraveling the existential analytic of ‘understanding,’ as an authentic interpretation of the disclosedness of Dasein, Heidegger examines that projection of our own inner most potentiality-for-Being. “If the term “understanding” is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.” Particularly important for our discussion is the fact that this projection of our potentiality-for-Being, which for Heidegger is our greatest purpose, is most fundamentally futural. One cannot project backwards into the past, as if we could project our possibilities of what has already been. We can only project our possibilities of becoming, that is, our possibilities in the future that have yet to become the past. This is the reason why Heidegger can claim, “Expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a mode of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation. Hence there lies in anticipation a more primordial Being-towards-death than in the concernful expecting of it.” It is because of our anticipation of the cessation of all our possibilities of becoming that allows for our authenticity of the present. Moreover, it is here in which Heidegger believes he is able to remain unified in the threefold structure of temporality. It is only because of the present anticipation that these futural possibilities become meaningful, and hence inextricably united to the present and to the having-been. It is here in which the moment of vision can occur as a present in which the authentic present is temporalized in terms of the authentic future. But it is important to notice here that the moment of vision, the realization of “that present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself,” is still one that is projecting towards the future, as it can do no other. A moment of vision in which the authentic present is anticipating the future can never be an anticipation of the past, of the having been. The very definition of the authentic present, of the moment of vision, cuts off the possibilities of the past, and only allows for the future. This is not necessarily a critique of Heidegger; rather it is the only logical conclusion of such an entity in which possibilities lie ahead of oneself. What will be a point of contention will not be the fact that the present is made authentic by our futural possibilities, but rather by the mechanism in which those futural possibilities can be realized, and if such possibilities necessitate a primordial orientation of the future that inversely limits the having-been of the past.

The Disclosedness of Temporality and Fear

For Heidegger a reality of Dasein is the fact that it is always thrown, it always has a mood, it never sits isolated unaffected by the Being-in-the-world relationships of its falling and thrownness. Some moods may act as a tranquilization or distraction in which case the mood acts to turn away from Dasein as inauthenticity. But more uniquely, some moods turn inward, revealing the onto-ontological structure of Dasein, demonstrating its grounding in a Being which exists and in which being is itself an issue for itself. Fear exemplifies such a mood in which our reaction to events alarm us and naturally allow us to turn inward, and an existential analytic of fear demonstrates that in order for fear to be rationally understood it requires a Being in whose existence is threatened. Hence, Dasein becomes a primordial presupposition for which fear can be grounded. But more important for our discussion, Heidegger ties together this existential awareness found in fear with the future-self. Referring to a malum futurum, Heidegger argues that “Is it not the primary meaning of fear the future, and least of all, one’s having been? Not only does fearing ‘relate’ itself to ‘something future’ in the signification of something which first comes on ‘in time’; but this self-relating is itself futural in the primordially temporal sense.” Hence for Heidegger, there is a twofold futural aspect that fear reveals. First, fear is primarily of something oncoming, an expectation of some evil. This reveals fear as futural in the sense of future possibilities. Second, this malum futurum reveals a primordial orientation of the future that signifies a self-relation that is primarily futural. This reveals fear as futural in the primordial foundation of existence, as a revealing of Dasein as primordially ‘facing forward.’ Hence, fear reveals that Dasein is primordially grounded toward the future in its very essence, and more specifically toward future possibilities.
This existential analytic is vital for our discussion because it exemplifies a place in which Heidegger seemingly contradicts his intentionality. First, however, this is not to say that Heidegger is not attempting to draw out the interconnectedness of the having been with the future, but rather that the interconnectedness that is drawn out is not sufficient. Heidegger says, “Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of state-of-mind, are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care.” Here he acknowledges the having been which allows for the futural, but only in passing, not substantially. Moreover, immediately following this statement, he moves on to more explication of the future of resoluteness. Hence, on one hand, the equiprimordial unity of the horizons of temporality seemingly rejects the prioritization of one horizon over and against another. Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger argues that the malum futurum demonstrates the priority of the future-self in terms of its primordially temporal sense. For this reason, we can expose here, preliminarily, the broader contradiction of consistency in Heidegger’s structure of unity. When we explicate an appendage to the unity of temporality we will expose this as a place in which we can tie together, not only in passing but substantially, the repercussions of a primordial future which is grounded in the having been.

Repetition and the Role of the Past

We can spend our entire discussion drawing out the myriad of places in which Heidegger prioritizes the futural over and against the having been. However, our contention is not so bold as to assume that Heidegger completely displaces the having been entirely, but rather that he does not draw out all of its ramifications. For this reason we must move now from places in which Heidegger exposes his priority of the future-self, to understanding where the past having been already has an explicit role in his structure of temporality.
The role of the past, for Heidegger, hinges on the repetition, or handing down, of traditional notions of Dasein. “It is rather in Dasein’s temporality, and there only, that there lies any possibility that the existentiell potentiality-for-Being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned explicitly from the way in which Dasein has been traditionally understood.” The repetition of traditional notions of Dasein has to be one that is understood critically. To be sure, what Heidegger is not arguing for here is that we ought to uncritically hand down past interpretations for the sake of the past. Rather, the small role that he does provide here is for the past to be critically examined in the present, to ‘look backwards’ only so as to find possibilities of Dasein that has been there, but yet to be realized. Hence, we can draw out two conclusions from Heidegger’s meager role of the past. First, even in drawing out the role of the past, Heidegger believes that the real aim is the possibilities of the future, the retrieval of unrealized potentiality to be realized. Second, the role of the past as ‘giver’ of unrealized potentialities becomes the singular function for the having been, any notion of repeated authentic potentialities that are intrinsically disclosing are rejected because they have already been realized. “The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been-the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero-is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated.”
This limitation on the past can also be seen in Heidegger’s notion that the past is not to be the aim of the possibilities of Dasein, but rather always a tool for the present. The past is not to be accepted in the present for its own sake, but for the future possibilities of present Dasein. “The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is ‘past,’ nor does it bind the Present back to that which has already been outstripped.” This limitation of the role of the past is, to Heidegger, necessitated by his understanding of Dasein’s projection of futural possibilities. If the proper function of Dasein is the realization in the present of futural possibilities, or the temporalizing of its temporality, then the having been there can only be useful insofar that it can reveal unrealized futural possibilities. Hence, the role of the having been becomes sifting through lost potentialities.
As an analogy to this, Heidegger discusses the role of equipment that was formally within-the-world, but now in a museum where we consider it ‘historical.’ The phenomenon of placing items of equipment into museums to be seen and looked at as items of the past represents a unique role that demonstrates the having been intrinsic to Dasein. As such a brief excurses into his analysis will prove beneficial for our discussion. Only a Being in which a past is an issue for itself would recognize the previous ready-to-hand equipment of previous Dasein. But when phenomenologically examined, several questions emerge. On what basis do we decide that these pieces of equipment are ‘historical’? They exist as present-at-hand, so why would we consider them part of the ‘past’? Just as the pyramids of Egypt or the Mayan temples, they penetrate into our world as present-at-hand but in a recognizably peculiar manner as no longer ready-at-hand. Yet, we still build museums in which to visit these artifacts and take tours of temples which were long ago disused as ready-at-hand. Seemingly, present Dasein are curiously aware of previous, having been there Dasein. Ultimately, Heidegger believes that we consider such equipment as historical, or part of the ‘past,’ because they no longer exist in the world where they belong, and more importantly, where concernful Dasein found use for them. When they are removed from their world, and when they are removed from the Dasein in which it was a ready-at-hand tool, they become part of the having been, the past. This is an important insight that has parallels within our discussion of the having been in context of futural possibilities. First, such equipment which is mutually understood as historical, presupposes a Dasein in which such ready-at-hand equipment becomes meaningful. Hence, we can rightly claim that the very notion of historicality presupposes a Dasein in which such equipment is meaningful, and hence a Dasein who existed with futural possibilities and a past. Second, the very fact that we collectively mark this equipment as historical, and thus out of the world in which they are meaningfully encountered as ready-to-hand, we recognize in ourselves our own potentialities for the future. We prioritize our own futural possibilities and glean from the ‘world-historical’ only that which quaintly reminds us of other Dasein in who also had present possibilities. We become fascinated by this past equipment because they allow us to recognize other Dasein and remind us of our own futural possibilities within the present.
Yet, such a reoccurring phenomenon, namely of the past always reminding us of the present futural possibilities, for Heidegger, delimits the having been as functioning only to provide a path to the futural. Hence, we see a distortion of the unity of the three temporal horizons, as the past loses its own inherent worth as horizon in and of itself, and instead functions secondarily as a ‘helper’ to realize the future. Even the present self is always enamored with futural possibilities, only being authentic when recognizing the unrealized potentialities. Under the existential priority of the future, the having been, and even the present, become subsumed.

The Disunity of the Temporal Horizons

As we mentioned above, Heidegger aims at an interconnectedness of the three horizons that preserves temporality as ontologically equiprimordial. Yet, as we have seen, Heidegger prioritizes the futural possibilities over and against the having been. The past becomes relevant and meaningful only because we can sift through it for unrealized potentialities. Even the having been becomes a gateway to the futural. It is my contention that this represents a disunity of the equiprimordial unity of temporality and more fundamentally moves further away from a true representation of the unity of temporality.
We also mentioned above that what is in contention is not that the present is made authentic by our futural possibilities, but rather the mechanism in which we locate these futural possibilities. Heidegger assumes that because Dasein is a being primarily concerned with its future potentialities, “the future makes ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being,” that the other horizons will be disposed toward the futural self. Here there is no disagreement. The realization of the present futural possibilities certainly provides the guiding role in Dasein, and even in the reception of the past. Yet, such futural possibilities need not dominate the other horizons so as they lose any recognizable worth outside of the futural horizon. Such a notion surely destroys the previous insight that the unity of temporality must be held equiprimordially. The role of the having been and the present must have a proper ontological worth all their own if they are to have an equal seat at the table of temporality. Moreover, the having been must have more of a role than merely being ‘picked over’ by the present if it truly is representative of past Dasein’s and their own potentialities. Ostensibly, in order to preserve the integrity of the unity of temporality, several criteria need to be met that Heidegger seemingly neglects. First, all three horizons of temporality, if to be held to Heidegger’s own standard, must be held to have equal ontological worth in and of themselves. Second, the having been must have more of a role in the present and future than merely being a tool for the futural horizon.

Toward an Equally Unified Structure of Temporality

If we are to remain consistent in adhering to Heidegger’s equiprimordial unity of temporality we must address the disunity of an existential priority of the future that has an inverse relationship on the having-been. To accomplish this task, we will espouse two major themes that must be addressed in conjunction with a broader Heideggerian notion of temporality that we have already uncovered. First, we will agree with Heidegger that Dasein’s realization of future possibilities is a primordial interest for the present. However, we will fortify this insight by providing the equal ontological support that all three horizons inherently demand, resisting the temptation to have the futural self overwhelm the past. Second, only after we have given sufficient ontological status to the having been, we will draw out its repercussions into the foundation of the present and its role in producing futural possibilities. The goal in such a schematic is to move the threefold equiprimordial unity of temporality to not only fully recognize the having been, but to center it towards a more Heideggerian notion of equiprimordality.
For Heidegger, one’s own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in the present through projecting one’s possibilities. Moreover, it is this very potentiality-for-Being which Dasein realizes in the present and which allows for the authentic self to stretch between birth and death. This ‘facing forward’ of Dasein, as a Being-towards-death, is inherent to its temporal structure and guides Dasein in its search for the unrealized potentialities of its being. In this regard, when we examine the role of the past we see it presented to the present self so as to provide the present self with unrealized possibilities. The primary role of the present, as a Being who exists always in a now, must always have his possibilities in front of oneself. Hence, for such a Being the past would always been interpreted through the hermeneutics of the present concerns of Dasein in conjunction with futural possibilities. In this general schematic, we have no disagreement. We do not admire the having been for its own sake; nor could we project our possibilities into the past, but rather are always projecting towards the futural self. However, it is still the past having been which is the foundation on which the futural self is given the integrity to strive for futural possibilities. As Heidegger rightfully recognizes, the having been reminds the present of past Dasein’s in whom also had their own having been and futural potentiality. For this reason, we must recognize the inherent existential and ontological status of such a having been, the past horizon of temporality which functions to recognize previous Dasein and to provide the integrity of historicality in the present. If we recognize that the past holds other Daseins that also had a primordial unity of temporality, we must recognize such a horizon as equally existentially valid. Under this view, the having been forms the primordial grounding on which the futural possibilities are grounded and made historical.
As the grounding on which the futural possibilities are grounded, and even made possible, an inverse relationship between horizons is ostensibly removed under this understanding of the horizons. If the having been is understood in a synergetic relationship with the futural horizon, as understood as the having been grounding the future in the historical and the future grounding the having been in its possibilities of becoming, then both horizons become interdependent, none holds a higher ontological weight than the other, and both become realized in the present. We see Heidegger move towards this direction when he writes, “Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a succession. The future is not later than having been is not earlier than the Present.” However where Heidegger understood this non-sequential ecstases as the equiprimordial unity of temporality while retaining a higher priority for the futural horizon, we can rightly draw out the conclusion that if we desire to keep such unity it necessitates an equi-ontological status where both the having been and the futural self are grounded in the present.
Recalling Heidegger’s existential analytic of fear as a disclosedness of temporality, we can view a concrete place in which this having been and futural self can be grounded in the present. Heidegger argued that fear provides a primordial presupposition of a Dasein in which fear is rationally understood. In addition, moods for Heidegger are primarily grounded in having been and hence fear is primarily grounded in having been, but yet also reveals this primordial orientation of Dasein towards the future. However, Heidegger only mentions the relationship between fear and having been in passing, not drawing out its repercussions in conjunction with this primordial orientation towards future possibilities. If an existential analytic of fear reveals a Dasein in which fear can be rationally grounded, then it must also reveal a Dasein which not only recognizes futural possibilities, but past having been possibilities. Fear as a mood only is possible if there is past experiences in which the present experience is grounded and made possible. If there was no having been or grounding in the past, the mood of fear would be impossible. Moreover, if there was no past experience of fear, there would be no reason to fear in the present. There would be no reason to fear if fear had never first been experienced in a having been. The very mood of fear, as Heidegger rightly concludes, reveals an orientation toward future possibilities, but just as importantly also reveals a primordial foundation of those possibilities that is grounded in a having been. It is only because of the past, of the having been that these futural possibilities can be shaped and formed. It is only because of past experiences that the futural possibilities discovered in fear are uncovered. Hence, the repercussions of Heidegger’s existential analytic of fear need to be drawn out in its entirety, as not only revealing future possibilities, but also revealing the grounding of those futural possibilities in the having been, molded together in the present. In fear, the equiprimordial unity of temporality is exemplified and demonstrates the vitality of the past horizon as truly interconnected with the futural. In fear, the past and futural are molded into the present, forming the unity of the three horizons.
Second, when we realize the equiprimordial unity of temporality, and thus the ontological weight inherent to the having been, we can draw out its repercussions in understanding Dasein’s futural possibilities. If we recognize that the present molds together the futural self, providing the projection of our possibilities of being, than we can also recognize the role of the past, or repetition, not merely as a ‘dealing with,’ or sifting through, but as providing the very foundation for which those possibilities are grounded and made available. In other words, the past no longer has to be understood merely as a ‘helper’ in providing unrealized potentiality, (although it certainly can function as such) but it can also be understood as a solid foundation in which future possibilities are given historicality and sustenance. The role of tradition, for example, no longer must be understood as mere repetition for the past’s sake, but as a grounding on which future possibilities can be understood within the present. Under this framework, repetition does not only play the role of sifting for unrealized possibilities, but also provides the foundation for which the moment of vision of authentic existence can be legitimately formulated as possibilities which are recognized as only existing because of the having been. If, as the existential analytic of fear demonstrates, that futural possibilities are only made possible through the having been, then the role of the past need not only be one of picking over for unrealized potentials for the future, but can be understood as the integrity of those unrealized potentials to even be discovered. If there was no past, no having been or traditions, then there would be no recognition of futural possibilities in which the authentic self can be realized. Rather, it is only because of the past that these futural possibilities gain coherence and can be recognized. Hence, the role of the past cannot simply be diminished by the futural horizon, but rather embraced as the foundation on which the futural horizon is recognized in the present.
In this manner, repetition is not understood as something handed down for the sake of the past, but retains Heidegger’s orientation of Dasein toward future possibilities. Repetition is understood as handing down for the sake of the present, for the potentiality of becoming, as the firm foundation on which those possibilities are molded into the present. Under such an understanding, the equiprimordial unity of temporality actually preserves the need for repetition to form the foundation of the future self. Under this schematic, not only does repetition seemingly re-discover its role in the present, but the equiprimordial unity of temporality ostensibly demands such an undertaking. If Dasein’s futural possibilities are only recognized through the grounding of a having been and a past, then the very phenomenon of our futural possibilities actually existing demonstrates that we already utilize this having been. Hence, the goal of such a re-discovery of the having been is not to somehow ‘bring’ the past into the present, but rather to recognize the impact of the having been into the formation of the present possibilities of the future.
We began our discussion by asking two related questions, namely, is Heidegger consistent in his treatment of temporality as equiprimordial among the three horizons? And, in Being and Time does the past-self and the future-self really have an equal share in determining the present? Heidegger, even though in passing he claims to preserve such equiprimordial unity of temporality, in substance fails to do so. Rather, he prioritizes the futural self to the detriment of the having been, regulating the past to a diminished role of merely offering up unrealized possibilities. Consequently, as left within Being and Time, the future-self has more of an equal share than the past-self. However, as we have demonstrated, this violated Heidegger’s own insight into the need for an equiprimordial unity. We have argued that this can only be substantially understood when all three horizons are recognized as holding equi-ontological weight, each with an inherent worth as horizon. The having been must be understood as both a horizon in which previous Dasein’s, with their own threefold temporality, existed as well as a horizon in which grounds the futural possibilities in the present. We can concretely see this need for the having been to ground future possibilities within Heidegger’s own existential analytic of fear, requiring a past in order for the future to be made relevant. Moreover, we argued that repetition and handing down must not only be understood as merely a potentiality to be sifted over, but as the very foundation in which we recognize our futural possibilities. And in this manner, we can recognize that if we desire to remain consistent to Heidegger’s own notion of equiprimordial unity of temporality, we must readily admit the equi-ontological status of having been into our noetical structure, understanding it as an operative horizon in which our future possibilities, our future being, are grounded in the present.