“Homo delectatur in
ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium.” – Thomas
Aquinas[1]
[1] Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologica [ST], 1, q. 91, a. 3, ad. 3. The Latin
texts are from Opera omnia iussu
impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4-12: Summa theologiae Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de
Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888-1889. English translations are from Summa theologica (New York: Benziger,
1946).
There is a long and convoluted history
to Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy of beauty. No more is this seen then in the
debate on whether or not, according to Thomas, beauty should be understood as a
transcendental.[1]
On both sides of the debate, we can find well respected Thomists, each citing
their own passages from Thomas which, they believe, solidify their argument.
What is the source of such disagreement and divergence? Ultimately, the source
of such disagreement can be found in the ambiguity within the Thomistic corpus.
Thomas does not thematize beauty in the way that later philosophers will.[2]While
he does discuss beauty, it is never the subject of direct discussion on its
own; it always comes into the debate implicitly, in answer to a different
question. Nevertheless, even with these given limitations, Thomas does have
something to say about beauty which deserves attention.
Perhaps his most famous line about
beauty is “pulcha sunt quae visa placent.”[3]
In this statement we begin to understand the foundation upon which Thomas
understands beauty, namely as a relation and a visio.[4]For
Thomas, beauty in things is something which is apprehended through sight, that
is, through a relationship between the knower (i.e. the intellect) and the
thing (res).[5]Nevertheless,
following Thomas’ own definition of beauty, we are left not with the essence of
beauty, but rather its effect on the knower.[6]For
this reason, some have contended that Thomas’ philosophy of beauty is an early
form of subjectivism, as it seems that beauty is merely found in the
intellect’s visio to some object.[7]
Thomas may have been reacting against the more Augustinian views of beauty
which were completely objective.[8]Yet,
it would be incorrect to interpret Thomas as holding a purely subjectivist
understanding of beauty, as he holds that there are three determinate criteria
in which beauty exists in an object. These criteria are: claritas, integritas,
andproportio. Thomas writes, “Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur.
Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio: quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso
turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas; unde
quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.”[9]Hence,
it would be wrong to argue that Thomas understood beauty as either completely
subjective or objective, but rather encompassing both. As Aidan Nichols writes,
“Yes, the beautiful is constituted by an intentional relation between the knowing
subject and the reality in question. But the reality in question possesses a
structure of such a kind that integral elements therein offer themselves for
the contemplation that delights. Yes, there must be subjective visualization,
but objective conditions must also be met if the beautiful is to be.”[10]
This seems to be partially the reason behind Thomas’ insistence that the
apprehension of beauty is an act of the intellect.
Thomas writes, “Pulchrum autem
respicit vim cognoscitivam; pulchra enim dicunter quae visa placent.”[11]In
other words, there is a direct relationship between the apprehension of the
beautiful and the act of the intellect in knowing. He continues in another
place, “…pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.”[12]What
is important to note here is Thomas’ use of apprehensio, which seemingly
ties the appreciation of the beauty of an object to the inquiry of the mind. As
Umberto Eco writes, “It [apprehensio] may therefore be defined as a kind
of seeing or looking which is mediated by the senses but is of an
intellectually cognitive order, and which is both disinterested and yet
produces a certain kind of pleasure.”[13]
Here we can see a possible connection between the intellect’s ability to know
things through intellectus as opposed to ratio. Thomas argues in
his Questiones Disputate de Veritate that the human mind is capable of a
discursive reasoning which is accomplished through ratio but also a more
simple knowledge which is apprehended through a “spiritual vision,” and hence
more closely related to how higher spiritual substances know.[14]Here
the human mind passively receives from the object itself, and hence the object
acts on the knower, as opposed to the knower acting on the object. This seems
to be the epistemological basis upon which beauty can be ordered to the
intellect. The intellect, while at rest, passively receives and apprehends the
beauty of the natural object through a “spiritual vision” of the intellectus.
For this reason, Thomas always correlates beauty as something known by the
intellect, and as properly ordered toward the mind through a visio. The
apprehension of beauty is not a discursive analysis, but a receptive vision of
the object through the intellect. Yet, what does the intellect see in the
object which apprehends beauty?
Here Thomas argues that “ergo
dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem
rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, bonum laudatur ut
pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt.”[15]
But what does it mean that pulchrum and bonum are idem?
Thomas argues that on a fundamental level, goodness and beauty are the same,
but ordered, on a logical level, to different ends. Where goodness is ordered
to the will, beauty is ordered to the intellect, more specially, the intellect
as apprehending the form of the object.[16]
For this reason, we can understand the beautiful as the intellect ordered
toward the goodness in an object. Here, however, is also where there can be
confusion. If goodness is ordered to the will, and the intellect to truth, than
what does it mean to say that beauty is seen as the intellect ordered to
goodness? It is an awkward idea on the surface, but it makes sense if we
understand the form of an object as the terminus for the intellect and the
holder of the good of the object. If the formal cause of a natural object is
the foundation of beauty in an object, then the apprehension of the form
through intellectus, a passive “spiritual vision” of the form, makes
sense; in which case we can rightfully say that the apprehension of beauty is
the intellect (intellectus) ordered to the goodness (causae formalis)
of a particular natural object.[17]In
this regard, beauty seemingly shares a function with intentionality, which too
operates as a “bridge” between the will and the intellect.
Above we mentioned that Thomas argues
that the objective form of beauty consists of claritas, integritas,
and proportio. If we understand Thomas as presenting a view of natural
beauty which is both subjective and objective, than we can understand Thomas as
arguing that these three criteria are found in the form of an object (the
objective), yet in relationship with its particularities (the subjective). If
we understand the foundation of the objective beauty in a natural object to be
the form, than the claritas ought to be understood as the
communicability of the form to the intellect which apprehends.[18]Moreover,
integritas is related to perfection, as to entirety and wholeness of the
integrity of its parts. Thomas writes, “Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum
quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma
totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit.”[19]
Hence, we can understand integritas as the perfection and wholeness of
the form coming forth from the object. Finally, proportio can relate to
many different aspects of Thomas’ understanding of beauty, besides the fact
that the entire notion of beauty as apprehended to an intellect already entails
that beauty is itself a proportion. There are at least six various uses of
proportion that Thomas uses that could be accounted for in his discussion of
beauty. Nevertheless, one in particular seems especially helpful for our
discussion, namely his connection between proportion and harmony. Thomas
discusses harmony and proportion most especially in connection to music.[20]He
writes, “Et dicit quod cum symphonia, id est vox consonans et proportionate,
sit vox quaedam, et vox quodammodo sit idem quod auditus, et symphonia sit
quaedam proportio, necesse est quod auditus sit quaedam proportio.”[21]
This passage is interesting because it entails the relationship between
proportion and the senses, the same type of proportion that occurs in beauty.
Hence, we can understand proportion as a sort of harmony that exists within the
object itself, yet also in relation to sense knowledge, that is, in relation to
a mind.
[1]
For example, see Kovach’s critique of Gilson in: Francis
J. Kovach. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1974. And cf with:
Marie-Dominque Philippe, L'activité
artistique, Volume 2, pages 246-295 (Paris:
Beauchesne, 1970).
[2]
Peter Haidu has an interesting article on the juxtaposition between medieval
aesthetics and modernity in:, Vol. 92, No. 5, Comparative Literature (Dec.,
1977), pp. 875-887.
[4] “Unde pulchrum in debita proportione
consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi
similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva.”ST, I, q. 5,
a. 4, ad. 1.
[5]
This intentionally mirrors the process of intellection, namely the adequation
between the intellect and the thing known. We will explore this relationship
(between the act of knowing and the act of apprehending beauty) below.
[6] See Umberto Eco’s Aesthetics of
Thomas Aquinas, pg. 57. While there is much to be desired in Eco’s work, he
does present a reasoned appreciation of Thomas’ understanding of beauty as visio.
Also see: Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2002). For an excellent critique of this work see:
Michael Morris, “Umberto Eco Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages,” Book Review, The
Thomist 52, 1 (January 1988), pp 181-183.
[7] M. de Munnynck represents the most universally
recognized subjectivist interpretation of Thomas’ visio. See his
classical work:“L’esthetique de Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Auctores Varii, S.
Tommaso d’Aquino (Milan, 1923).
[8] Augustine writes. “Si prius quaeram
utrum ideo pulchra sint quia delectant; aut ideo delectent quia pulchra sunt;
hic mihi sine dubitatione respondebitur, ideo delectare quia pulchra sunt.” De
Vera Religione.
[10] Aidan Nichols, Redeeming Beauty,
(London: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), pg. 13.
[14]
Q.D. de Veritate, 15, I. Josef Pieper has an excellent treatment of the
intellectus/ratio distinction in his work, Leisure, the Basis of Culture,
(New York: Ignatius Press, 2009), esp. pg. 29.
[16]
ST I, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 1. “Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem,
similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae
formalis.”
[17]
At this point it would be possible to go into the long and convoluted history
of the debate as to whether or not beauty is a transcendental; however this
would be a divergence from our main point. Briefly, some argue that because
beauty and goodness are fundamentally the same, and because goodness is a
transcendental, logically this would entail beauty as a transcendental as well.
However, others, citing Thomas’ list of transcendentals at the beginning of de
Veritate (where beauty is not listed), argue that beauty only makes sense
as a product of goodness in relation to a mind, and therefore should not be
convertible with being. For the purposes of this work we will not be engaging
this problem directly; however it is beneath many of our observations.
[20] For medieval
musical theory see: Richard Pastell. “Medieval Art and the Performance of
Medieval Music.” Early Music, Vol. 15, No. 1
(Feb., 1987), pp. 56-68.
No comments:
Post a Comment