Peter Lombard and The Existence of God

An excerpt from an article I wrote:

Peter begins his metaphysics by providing four interesting arguments for the existence of God. The following arguments highlight Peter’s philosophical influences systematically through Abelard, yet also demonstrating dependency on Augustinian philosophy mirroring the Victorines. Hence, Peter’s arguments for the existence of God provide a window into the middle ground Peter tried to navigate between a Victorine (and Porphyrian) Neo-Platonism and a Abelardian methodology, while at the same time reflecting his own undeniable philosophical genius.

Peter’s first argument for the existence of God is a hypothetical situation. Peter asks us to imagine a person who is contemplating the empirical world. Imagine a person who sees and understands that everything around him or her seemingly changes. Heraclitus was partially right, we do indeed live in a world of change. The child changes into an adult, the night into the day, the tree into lumber. Change is constantly all around us, each being changing into something else. Moreover, it seems, every being comes to existence through the power of a different being. The house built by the laborer, the tree is grown out of the soil, the infant born from the mother, the sea vessel built by the shipwrights, knowledge gleaned from a teacher, or a painting formed from the idea in the mind of the painter. From such awareness of change we must conclude that there must logically be a creature which caused into being all that exists around us. If everything has a being which caused it, there must be a being that also caused everything around us. However, here we are met with a dilemma; no one has ever seen a creature with the ability and power to accomplish such an enormous task. We have plenty of observed evidence of beings creating or changing other beings, but we have no such observation of the creation of creation. Moreover, any empirical creature capable of creating everything around us is not observed, and even if such an empirical creature was observed, we would then simply ask, what caused him? But to continually ask, what caused him, and the cause of him, and the cause of the cause, would be to ask ad infinitum. Yet, as is observably true, all things are caused by a being. Therefore, we must conclude that there is a being above all the created beings which is capable of this creation, yet who himself was not caused. It is this being that we call God.[1]

Peter’s second argument is in direct reference to Aristotelian causality and offers the reader a glimpse into Peter’s own philosophical training, or at the least his partial awareness of the Aristotelian corpus. This second argument is also based on the concept of change. Peter argues that we ought to look around ourselves at the empirical world. Just as the above scenario, we easily notice a constant element to reality, namely that things change. The baby grows into adulthood, the chestnut into an oak tree and the tree into a house. All things that exist, seemingly, necessarily change. Yet, we are met with another puzzling dilemma. If we are cognitively aware that everything around us is changing, how are we even aware of the concept of change to begin with? If everything was in a state of change, then we would never know it as change, as we would have nothing to judge change against. If all that exists changes, then there is nothing to recognize that there is in fact a change occurring. Where do we get the notion of change from if everything observable is changing? Only the existence of the eternal and unchanging allows for us to recognize the changing in observable things. Yet, where do we observe the eternal unchanging in the empirical world? We just said everything around us that is observable is changing. Rather, there must be an unchanging eternality which exists outside of change (temporality), yet allows us to hold the empirical world against it to understand our own changing world. It is this unchanging eternality that we call God.[2]

The above arguments both share interesting philosophical presuppositions. First, both of the above arguments reflect the empirical, natural world as the starting point for argumentation. In presupposing empiricism and the state of nature as the criteria for religious epistemology, Peter implicitly acknowledges and embraces natural ontology (theology) and affirms the mind’s ability to arrive at knowledge of God through nature. Moreover the Lombard affirms a correspondence theory of truth where the agent knows an object through direct abstraction (passive observation) of the object’s form. (What is unclear so far is whether it is an Aristotelian hylomorphic abstraction of the agent intellect and then forming a habitual intellect, or whether it is a Platonic recollection of the form.) Either way, we know the changing object is a real being, hence we know there must be a God who is a real being. As a result, Peter exposes a preliminary mark of what will be scholasticism and foreshadows the thirteenth century and Thomas Aquinas. Second, both of the above arguments reflect knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy and a willingness to employ Aristotelian philosophy in typically Neo-Platonic environments. Moreover, the second argument is entirely based on a pre-Socratic argument that was also predominant in the work of both Plato and Aristotle. Hence, we can rightfully conclude that Peter purposely used philosophical tools in order to advance theological arguments, clearly mirroring the Abelardian school but also more broadly shaping scholastic methodology which will become undoubtedly marked by both Neo-Platonism(s) and Aristotelianism.

Peter’s third argument also exposes his Augustinian roots. He argues that substance, substantia, is composed of equal elements, namely body and spirit (form and matter). Yet, demonstrating a Porphyrian dichotomy (notice the ontological hierarchy), Peter argues that spirit is ontologically better then body. Hence, he argues, it is better to be a spirit than a body, yet even better to be that which made the spirit, namely God the creator.[3] This argument heavily exposes Peter’s Augustinianism and Porphyrian Neo-Platonic philosophical roots. In embracing a higher ontological status for spirit than body, Peter is able to correlate spirit with a closer relation to the divine along a hierarchy of beings. In addition, this argument clearly represents a typically Neo-Platonic understanding of matter and demonstrates the absence of Aristotelian hylomorphism yet to arrive in Western Europe’s philosophical theology until the thirteenth century.(Also implying that the first and second arguments are probably more geared toward a recollection of forms.)

Finally, Peter’s fourth argument is perhaps his most philosophically interesting. He argues that the intellect is capable of distinguishing between two types of intelligibility. First, the mind is capable of perceiving that which exists empirically, through the aggressive investigation of ratio. Second, the mind is also capable of perceiving that which is spiritual and universal through the intellect’s ability to (recall) form from matter. Yet, Peter argues, that which is perceived as universal is preferable over that which is perceived as particular and temporal. We see this, as all Augustinians would argue, most easily in the human person which is both body and form, together spiritual and empirical. Hence, we can argue that a person can be at one time beautiful and at another imperfect, and flawed. However, the only way in which we can imagine a person as beautiful and yet flawed is to have a foreknowledge of that which is pure beauty and not flawed, something in which we judge the materially beautiful. Yet, such a being could not have matter, or it would be said to be flawed. Hence, one must conclude that there is a being that is both perfect and beautiful, yet not in a body, and it is this being that we call God.[4]

From the above arguments for the existence of God, we can conclude the following of Peter’s philosophical theology. For Peter, God is capable of being known through reason and philosophy, purposely embracing well known philosophical arguments that reflect knowledge of secular (ancient) philosophy, a clear mark of what will become scholasticism. Moreover, Peter believes that philosophy can demonstrate that God can be known as singular, simple, and lacking accidental qualities.[5] Furthermore, Peter demonstrates the willingness and ability to use analogical reasoning to have knowledge of God. From perpetuity of creatures, the Creator must be eternal, from greatness in creatures, God must be all-powerful, from order and disposition, God is wise, from governance over things, God is good and just. Through this analogous reasoning, Peter again demonstrates a natural theology that embraces tradition, nature, and secular philosophy and sets the stage for further analysis and implementation of analogical reasoning to be developed and refined in later scholasticism.

We began our discussion by saying that the mark of scholasticism is the “intellectual penetration of the faith, the systematization of the texts upon which the faith is based, and dialogue with non-Christian thought.”[6] From exposing Peter’s particular argumentation for the existence of God we can rightfully conclude that he meets such a definition. Peter Lombard fields a theological and philosophical paradigm that has as its basis, Holy Scripture and Christian tradition. Yet, he also prioritizes a vital role for philosophical reasoning and natural theology. In so doing, Peter reflects a third way in methodology. Using the Augustinian philosophy and theology of the Victorines, Peter clearly reflects content indebted to Hugh of St. Victor. Using the new topical systematization of Peter Abelard, Peter Lombard demonstrates the serious scholarship of the newly formed professional theologians. Yet, in borrowing from both schools and forging his own methodology and content, Peter develops his own seminal paradigm. While he was tremendously influenced by Augustinianism, his unique systematization in construction, as well as his own argumentation is clearly visible in his Libri Quattuor Sententiarum. The vitality and genius of his work is demonstrated most profoundly in his theological and philosophical legacy, the well over fourteen hundred commentaries on his work. And in such a following, the influence of Peter Lombard is undeniable and his place among the leaders of scholastic philosophy and theology forever assured.

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[1] Lombard, Peter. Libri Quattuor Sententiarum. Iii.i.ii.

[2] Ibid. iii.i.iii.

[3] Ibid. iii.i.iv.

[4] Ibid. iii.i.v.

[5] Ibid. iii.i.vi.

[6] Grabmann, Martin. Geschichte der scholastischen Method. Vol. I, 62-63.

Here are some links to Peter Lombard's Sentences:

In Latin:

http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost12/PetrusLombardus/pet_s001.html

Partial English translation (a work in progress by the Franciscans):

http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/I-Sent.html

An Advocate for Scientific Realism Passes

Ernan McMullin, John Cardinal O’Hara Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, died February 8, 2011 at Letterkenny General Hospital in Donegal, Ireland. He was 86 years old. He was a wonderful source for critiques against epistemological nominalism and a source for a reasoned realism that addressed modern problems.

The Chronicle of Higher Education has an article here.

Is There Room For Tradition in Heidegger?

The Equiprimordial Unity of Temporality

A Critique of Heideggerian Existential Priority of the Future and an Appendage to the Threefold Temporality of Dasein



Introduction

“Temporality temporalizes as a future which makes present in the process of having been.” This foundational insight found in Heidegger’s seminal work Being and Time is the crux of a primordial temporal structure that unifies all three horizons of temporality. The Being in which such a primordial structure becomes meaningful, namely Dasein, is one that exists within such a structure. It is this temporal structure of Dasein which provides the threefold unity of its existence, namely its having been, its present and its futural possibilities. Each horizon of temporality represents a vital component of its existence, each required for the authentic moment of vision in which one realizes their possibilities for becoming more than they are. The reality of this insight, when expanded to its logical entailment, ought to explicitly describe equiprimordially the unity of temporality, an equal convergence of the three horizons of time, namely the having-been, the present and the future. And indeed Heidegger allows for such equiprimordial unity when he argues that “temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession.’ The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present.” The only logical conclusion to such a rejection of sequential ecstases is an entity which is “between birth and death [and] presents the whole which we have been seeking.” Hence, as an entity between birth and death, that is, a present in which there was a having-been but also a future as a Being-towards-death, Dasein stands as the true historical Being, equiprimordially justified in its threefold temporal convergence.
However, this seeming ‘interconnectedness’ of past, present, and future necessitates certain qualities of such a Being in which all three horizons are unified and made to bare. As such it will be this paper’s task to ask the question, is Heidegger consistent in his treatment of temporality as equiprimordial among the three horizons? In Being and Time does the past-self and the future-self really have an equal share in determining the present? As such, we will be examining Heidegger’s understanding of the threefold unity of temporality, with special attention to any priority of the future which inversely affects the having-been. After examining Heidegger’s position, I will conclude that his existential analytic of the threefold unity of temporality prioritizes the future-self to the detriment of the past and thus distorts the equiprimordial unity of the present. However, following Heidegger’s own undeniable insight, I will attempt to provide a clear path with a more equally unified structure of temporality, that is, in which the past and future are molded into the present. Such a path can prove not only more cogent as representative of our equiprimordality as Beings existing in threefold unity of temporality, but perhaps can also move Heidegger’s existential analytic of temporality to a more Heideggerian center in which the possibilities of the future are unconditionally grounded in a primordial having-been.

The Interconnectedness of Past, Present and Future

We begin by examining Heidegger’s intentionality with our attention toward the unity of temporality. It is undoubtedly Heidegger’s intention that all three horizons of temporality, which exposes the historicality of Dasein, be equiprimordial. In explicating the disclosedness of temporality (which we will examine below) he writes,
Understanding is grounded primarily in the future (whether in anticipation or in awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision). All the same, understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been’. All the same, one’s state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is making present. And all the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future.

In such a precise structure, Heidegger reveals his intention in uniting the threefold unity of temporality as equiprimordial and that the three horizons provide the framework for the temporalizing of temporality that is intrinsic to Dasein. Moreover, such interconnectedness provides the backbone for any futural possibilities that will so dominate Dasein’s existential and ontological make-up. It is only because of the having been that there are futural possibilities that are realized in the present. And, it is only because of futural possibilities that the having been becomes relevant in the present.
We can see this interdependency easily visible in understanding Dasein as an entity which is ‘between’ birth and death. In reflecting on his existential analytic so far Heidegger claims, “The connectedness of life in which Dasein somehow maintains itself constantly is precisely what we have overlooked in our analysis of Being-a-whole.” The nature of Dasein is one that has as its fundamental existence in this threefold horizon of temporality. It is precisely because of the historicality of Dasein, and its possibilities for the future that require such an equiprimordial unity. If one horizon becomes more primordial than another, this delicate balance between the three horizons is disturbed and the unity of temporality broken. It is this intentionality, namely the equiprimordial unity of the threefold temporality that we will examine in attempt to judge whether Heidegger remains consistent.

The Disclosedness of Temporality and its Possibilities

The concrete temporal constitution of care, an authentic disclosedness of Dasein, involves a structure of understanding, mood, falling, and discourse. Particularly relevant to our discussion on the primordial unity between the three horizons of temporality is Heidegger’s structure of “understanding.” Understanding can be understood in a twofold manner, linguistically as an existentiale or as an ontological existential. The former prioritizes the Being of a ‘there’ in which “on the basis of such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of looking around, and of just looking.” While such an understanding is merely ontic, it is still important to note that under such a term, Dasein is given its factical ability in which the existential meaning can be elucidated.
In unraveling the existential analytic of ‘understanding,’ as an authentic interpretation of the disclosedness of Dasein, Heidegger examines that projection of our own inner most potentiality-for-Being. “If the term “understanding” is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.” Particularly important for our discussion is the fact that this projection of our potentiality-for-Being, which for Heidegger is our greatest purpose, is most fundamentally futural. One cannot project backwards into the past, as if we could project our possibilities of what has already been. We can only project our possibilities of becoming, that is, our possibilities in the future that have yet to become the past. This is the reason why Heidegger can claim, “Expecting is founded upon awaiting, and is a mode of that future which temporalizes itself authentically as anticipation. Hence there lies in anticipation a more primordial Being-towards-death than in the concernful expecting of it.” It is because of our anticipation of the cessation of all our possibilities of becoming that allows for our authenticity of the present. Moreover, it is here in which Heidegger believes he is able to remain unified in the threefold structure of temporality. It is only because of the present anticipation that these futural possibilities become meaningful, and hence inextricably united to the present and to the having-been. It is here in which the moment of vision can occur as a present in which the authentic present is temporalized in terms of the authentic future. But it is important to notice here that the moment of vision, the realization of “that present which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself,” is still one that is projecting towards the future, as it can do no other. A moment of vision in which the authentic present is anticipating the future can never be an anticipation of the past, of the having been. The very definition of the authentic present, of the moment of vision, cuts off the possibilities of the past, and only allows for the future. This is not necessarily a critique of Heidegger; rather it is the only logical conclusion of such an entity in which possibilities lie ahead of oneself. What will be a point of contention will not be the fact that the present is made authentic by our futural possibilities, but rather by the mechanism in which those futural possibilities can be realized, and if such possibilities necessitate a primordial orientation of the future that inversely limits the having-been of the past.

The Disclosedness of Temporality and Fear

For Heidegger a reality of Dasein is the fact that it is always thrown, it always has a mood, it never sits isolated unaffected by the Being-in-the-world relationships of its falling and thrownness. Some moods may act as a tranquilization or distraction in which case the mood acts to turn away from Dasein as inauthenticity. But more uniquely, some moods turn inward, revealing the onto-ontological structure of Dasein, demonstrating its grounding in a Being which exists and in which being is itself an issue for itself. Fear exemplifies such a mood in which our reaction to events alarm us and naturally allow us to turn inward, and an existential analytic of fear demonstrates that in order for fear to be rationally understood it requires a Being in whose existence is threatened. Hence, Dasein becomes a primordial presupposition for which fear can be grounded. But more important for our discussion, Heidegger ties together this existential awareness found in fear with the future-self. Referring to a malum futurum, Heidegger argues that “Is it not the primary meaning of fear the future, and least of all, one’s having been? Not only does fearing ‘relate’ itself to ‘something future’ in the signification of something which first comes on ‘in time’; but this self-relating is itself futural in the primordially temporal sense.” Hence for Heidegger, there is a twofold futural aspect that fear reveals. First, fear is primarily of something oncoming, an expectation of some evil. This reveals fear as futural in the sense of future possibilities. Second, this malum futurum reveals a primordial orientation of the future that signifies a self-relation that is primarily futural. This reveals fear as futural in the primordial foundation of existence, as a revealing of Dasein as primordially ‘facing forward.’ Hence, fear reveals that Dasein is primordially grounded toward the future in its very essence, and more specifically toward future possibilities.
This existential analytic is vital for our discussion because it exemplifies a place in which Heidegger seemingly contradicts his intentionality. First, however, this is not to say that Heidegger is not attempting to draw out the interconnectedness of the having been with the future, but rather that the interconnectedness that is drawn out is not sufficient. Heidegger says, “Although both fear and anxiety, as modes of state-of-mind, are grounded primarily in having been, they each have different sources with regard to their own temporalization in the temporality of care.” Here he acknowledges the having been which allows for the futural, but only in passing, not substantially. Moreover, immediately following this statement, he moves on to more explication of the future of resoluteness. Hence, on one hand, the equiprimordial unity of the horizons of temporality seemingly rejects the prioritization of one horizon over and against another. Yet, on the other hand, Heidegger argues that the malum futurum demonstrates the priority of the future-self in terms of its primordially temporal sense. For this reason, we can expose here, preliminarily, the broader contradiction of consistency in Heidegger’s structure of unity. When we explicate an appendage to the unity of temporality we will expose this as a place in which we can tie together, not only in passing but substantially, the repercussions of a primordial future which is grounded in the having been.

Repetition and the Role of the Past

We can spend our entire discussion drawing out the myriad of places in which Heidegger prioritizes the futural over and against the having been. However, our contention is not so bold as to assume that Heidegger completely displaces the having been entirely, but rather that he does not draw out all of its ramifications. For this reason we must move now from places in which Heidegger exposes his priority of the future-self, to understanding where the past having been already has an explicit role in his structure of temporality.
The role of the past, for Heidegger, hinges on the repetition, or handing down, of traditional notions of Dasein. “It is rather in Dasein’s temporality, and there only, that there lies any possibility that the existentiell potentiality-for-Being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned explicitly from the way in which Dasein has been traditionally understood.” The repetition of traditional notions of Dasein has to be one that is understood critically. To be sure, what Heidegger is not arguing for here is that we ought to uncritically hand down past interpretations for the sake of the past. Rather, the small role that he does provide here is for the past to be critically examined in the present, to ‘look backwards’ only so as to find possibilities of Dasein that has been there, but yet to be realized. Hence, we can draw out two conclusions from Heidegger’s meager role of the past. First, even in drawing out the role of the past, Heidegger believes that the real aim is the possibilities of the future, the retrieval of unrealized potentiality to be realized. Second, the role of the past as ‘giver’ of unrealized potentialities becomes the singular function for the having been, any notion of repeated authentic potentialities that are intrinsically disclosing are rejected because they have already been realized. “The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been-the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero-is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated.”
This limitation on the past can also be seen in Heidegger’s notion that the past is not to be the aim of the possibilities of Dasein, but rather always a tool for the present. The past is not to be accepted in the present for its own sake, but for the future possibilities of present Dasein. “The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again something that is ‘past,’ nor does it bind the Present back to that which has already been outstripped.” This limitation of the role of the past is, to Heidegger, necessitated by his understanding of Dasein’s projection of futural possibilities. If the proper function of Dasein is the realization in the present of futural possibilities, or the temporalizing of its temporality, then the having been there can only be useful insofar that it can reveal unrealized futural possibilities. Hence, the role of the having been becomes sifting through lost potentialities.
As an analogy to this, Heidegger discusses the role of equipment that was formally within-the-world, but now in a museum where we consider it ‘historical.’ The phenomenon of placing items of equipment into museums to be seen and looked at as items of the past represents a unique role that demonstrates the having been intrinsic to Dasein. As such a brief excurses into his analysis will prove beneficial for our discussion. Only a Being in which a past is an issue for itself would recognize the previous ready-to-hand equipment of previous Dasein. But when phenomenologically examined, several questions emerge. On what basis do we decide that these pieces of equipment are ‘historical’? They exist as present-at-hand, so why would we consider them part of the ‘past’? Just as the pyramids of Egypt or the Mayan temples, they penetrate into our world as present-at-hand but in a recognizably peculiar manner as no longer ready-at-hand. Yet, we still build museums in which to visit these artifacts and take tours of temples which were long ago disused as ready-at-hand. Seemingly, present Dasein are curiously aware of previous, having been there Dasein. Ultimately, Heidegger believes that we consider such equipment as historical, or part of the ‘past,’ because they no longer exist in the world where they belong, and more importantly, where concernful Dasein found use for them. When they are removed from their world, and when they are removed from the Dasein in which it was a ready-at-hand tool, they become part of the having been, the past. This is an important insight that has parallels within our discussion of the having been in context of futural possibilities. First, such equipment which is mutually understood as historical, presupposes a Dasein in which such ready-at-hand equipment becomes meaningful. Hence, we can rightly claim that the very notion of historicality presupposes a Dasein in which such equipment is meaningful, and hence a Dasein who existed with futural possibilities and a past. Second, the very fact that we collectively mark this equipment as historical, and thus out of the world in which they are meaningfully encountered as ready-to-hand, we recognize in ourselves our own potentialities for the future. We prioritize our own futural possibilities and glean from the ‘world-historical’ only that which quaintly reminds us of other Dasein in who also had present possibilities. We become fascinated by this past equipment because they allow us to recognize other Dasein and remind us of our own futural possibilities within the present.
Yet, such a reoccurring phenomenon, namely of the past always reminding us of the present futural possibilities, for Heidegger, delimits the having been as functioning only to provide a path to the futural. Hence, we see a distortion of the unity of the three temporal horizons, as the past loses its own inherent worth as horizon in and of itself, and instead functions secondarily as a ‘helper’ to realize the future. Even the present self is always enamored with futural possibilities, only being authentic when recognizing the unrealized potentialities. Under the existential priority of the future, the having been, and even the present, become subsumed.

The Disunity of the Temporal Horizons

As we mentioned above, Heidegger aims at an interconnectedness of the three horizons that preserves temporality as ontologically equiprimordial. Yet, as we have seen, Heidegger prioritizes the futural possibilities over and against the having been. The past becomes relevant and meaningful only because we can sift through it for unrealized potentialities. Even the having been becomes a gateway to the futural. It is my contention that this represents a disunity of the equiprimordial unity of temporality and more fundamentally moves further away from a true representation of the unity of temporality.
We also mentioned above that what is in contention is not that the present is made authentic by our futural possibilities, but rather the mechanism in which we locate these futural possibilities. Heidegger assumes that because Dasein is a being primarily concerned with its future potentialities, “the future makes ontologically possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being,” that the other horizons will be disposed toward the futural self. Here there is no disagreement. The realization of the present futural possibilities certainly provides the guiding role in Dasein, and even in the reception of the past. Yet, such futural possibilities need not dominate the other horizons so as they lose any recognizable worth outside of the futural horizon. Such a notion surely destroys the previous insight that the unity of temporality must be held equiprimordially. The role of the having been and the present must have a proper ontological worth all their own if they are to have an equal seat at the table of temporality. Moreover, the having been must have more of a role than merely being ‘picked over’ by the present if it truly is representative of past Dasein’s and their own potentialities. Ostensibly, in order to preserve the integrity of the unity of temporality, several criteria need to be met that Heidegger seemingly neglects. First, all three horizons of temporality, if to be held to Heidegger’s own standard, must be held to have equal ontological worth in and of themselves. Second, the having been must have more of a role in the present and future than merely being a tool for the futural horizon.

Toward an Equally Unified Structure of Temporality

If we are to remain consistent in adhering to Heidegger’s equiprimordial unity of temporality we must address the disunity of an existential priority of the future that has an inverse relationship on the having-been. To accomplish this task, we will espouse two major themes that must be addressed in conjunction with a broader Heideggerian notion of temporality that we have already uncovered. First, we will agree with Heidegger that Dasein’s realization of future possibilities is a primordial interest for the present. However, we will fortify this insight by providing the equal ontological support that all three horizons inherently demand, resisting the temptation to have the futural self overwhelm the past. Second, only after we have given sufficient ontological status to the having been, we will draw out its repercussions into the foundation of the present and its role in producing futural possibilities. The goal in such a schematic is to move the threefold equiprimordial unity of temporality to not only fully recognize the having been, but to center it towards a more Heideggerian notion of equiprimordality.
For Heidegger, one’s own potentiality-for-Being is disclosed in the present through projecting one’s possibilities. Moreover, it is this very potentiality-for-Being which Dasein realizes in the present and which allows for the authentic self to stretch between birth and death. This ‘facing forward’ of Dasein, as a Being-towards-death, is inherent to its temporal structure and guides Dasein in its search for the unrealized potentialities of its being. In this regard, when we examine the role of the past we see it presented to the present self so as to provide the present self with unrealized possibilities. The primary role of the present, as a Being who exists always in a now, must always have his possibilities in front of oneself. Hence, for such a Being the past would always been interpreted through the hermeneutics of the present concerns of Dasein in conjunction with futural possibilities. In this general schematic, we have no disagreement. We do not admire the having been for its own sake; nor could we project our possibilities into the past, but rather are always projecting towards the futural self. However, it is still the past having been which is the foundation on which the futural self is given the integrity to strive for futural possibilities. As Heidegger rightfully recognizes, the having been reminds the present of past Dasein’s in whom also had their own having been and futural potentiality. For this reason, we must recognize the inherent existential and ontological status of such a having been, the past horizon of temporality which functions to recognize previous Dasein and to provide the integrity of historicality in the present. If we recognize that the past holds other Daseins that also had a primordial unity of temporality, we must recognize such a horizon as equally existentially valid. Under this view, the having been forms the primordial grounding on which the futural possibilities are grounded and made historical.
As the grounding on which the futural possibilities are grounded, and even made possible, an inverse relationship between horizons is ostensibly removed under this understanding of the horizons. If the having been is understood in a synergetic relationship with the futural horizon, as understood as the having been grounding the future in the historical and the future grounding the having been in its possibilities of becoming, then both horizons become interdependent, none holds a higher ontological weight than the other, and both become realized in the present. We see Heidegger move towards this direction when he writes, “Temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a succession. The future is not later than having been is not earlier than the Present.” However where Heidegger understood this non-sequential ecstases as the equiprimordial unity of temporality while retaining a higher priority for the futural horizon, we can rightly draw out the conclusion that if we desire to keep such unity it necessitates an equi-ontological status where both the having been and the futural self are grounded in the present.
Recalling Heidegger’s existential analytic of fear as a disclosedness of temporality, we can view a concrete place in which this having been and futural self can be grounded in the present. Heidegger argued that fear provides a primordial presupposition of a Dasein in which fear is rationally understood. In addition, moods for Heidegger are primarily grounded in having been and hence fear is primarily grounded in having been, but yet also reveals this primordial orientation of Dasein towards the future. However, Heidegger only mentions the relationship between fear and having been in passing, not drawing out its repercussions in conjunction with this primordial orientation towards future possibilities. If an existential analytic of fear reveals a Dasein in which fear can be rationally grounded, then it must also reveal a Dasein which not only recognizes futural possibilities, but past having been possibilities. Fear as a mood only is possible if there is past experiences in which the present experience is grounded and made possible. If there was no having been or grounding in the past, the mood of fear would be impossible. Moreover, if there was no past experience of fear, there would be no reason to fear in the present. There would be no reason to fear if fear had never first been experienced in a having been. The very mood of fear, as Heidegger rightly concludes, reveals an orientation toward future possibilities, but just as importantly also reveals a primordial foundation of those possibilities that is grounded in a having been. It is only because of the past, of the having been that these futural possibilities can be shaped and formed. It is only because of past experiences that the futural possibilities discovered in fear are uncovered. Hence, the repercussions of Heidegger’s existential analytic of fear need to be drawn out in its entirety, as not only revealing future possibilities, but also revealing the grounding of those futural possibilities in the having been, molded together in the present. In fear, the equiprimordial unity of temporality is exemplified and demonstrates the vitality of the past horizon as truly interconnected with the futural. In fear, the past and futural are molded into the present, forming the unity of the three horizons.
Second, when we realize the equiprimordial unity of temporality, and thus the ontological weight inherent to the having been, we can draw out its repercussions in understanding Dasein’s futural possibilities. If we recognize that the present molds together the futural self, providing the projection of our possibilities of being, than we can also recognize the role of the past, or repetition, not merely as a ‘dealing with,’ or sifting through, but as providing the very foundation for which those possibilities are grounded and made available. In other words, the past no longer has to be understood merely as a ‘helper’ in providing unrealized potentiality, (although it certainly can function as such) but it can also be understood as a solid foundation in which future possibilities are given historicality and sustenance. The role of tradition, for example, no longer must be understood as mere repetition for the past’s sake, but as a grounding on which future possibilities can be understood within the present. Under this framework, repetition does not only play the role of sifting for unrealized possibilities, but also provides the foundation for which the moment of vision of authentic existence can be legitimately formulated as possibilities which are recognized as only existing because of the having been. If, as the existential analytic of fear demonstrates, that futural possibilities are only made possible through the having been, then the role of the past need not only be one of picking over for unrealized potentials for the future, but can be understood as the integrity of those unrealized potentials to even be discovered. If there was no past, no having been or traditions, then there would be no recognition of futural possibilities in which the authentic self can be realized. Rather, it is only because of the past that these futural possibilities gain coherence and can be recognized. Hence, the role of the past cannot simply be diminished by the futural horizon, but rather embraced as the foundation on which the futural horizon is recognized in the present.
In this manner, repetition is not understood as something handed down for the sake of the past, but retains Heidegger’s orientation of Dasein toward future possibilities. Repetition is understood as handing down for the sake of the present, for the potentiality of becoming, as the firm foundation on which those possibilities are molded into the present. Under such an understanding, the equiprimordial unity of temporality actually preserves the need for repetition to form the foundation of the future self. Under this schematic, not only does repetition seemingly re-discover its role in the present, but the equiprimordial unity of temporality ostensibly demands such an undertaking. If Dasein’s futural possibilities are only recognized through the grounding of a having been and a past, then the very phenomenon of our futural possibilities actually existing demonstrates that we already utilize this having been. Hence, the goal of such a re-discovery of the having been is not to somehow ‘bring’ the past into the present, but rather to recognize the impact of the having been into the formation of the present possibilities of the future.
We began our discussion by asking two related questions, namely, is Heidegger consistent in his treatment of temporality as equiprimordial among the three horizons? And, in Being and Time does the past-self and the future-self really have an equal share in determining the present? Heidegger, even though in passing he claims to preserve such equiprimordial unity of temporality, in substance fails to do so. Rather, he prioritizes the futural self to the detriment of the having been, regulating the past to a diminished role of merely offering up unrealized possibilities. Consequently, as left within Being and Time, the future-self has more of an equal share than the past-self. However, as we have demonstrated, this violated Heidegger’s own insight into the need for an equiprimordial unity. We have argued that this can only be substantially understood when all three horizons are recognized as holding equi-ontological weight, each with an inherent worth as horizon. The having been must be understood as both a horizon in which previous Dasein’s, with their own threefold temporality, existed as well as a horizon in which grounds the futural possibilities in the present. We can concretely see this need for the having been to ground future possibilities within Heidegger’s own existential analytic of fear, requiring a past in order for the future to be made relevant. Moreover, we argued that repetition and handing down must not only be understood as merely a potentiality to be sifted over, but as the very foundation in which we recognize our futural possibilities. And in this manner, we can recognize that if we desire to remain consistent to Heidegger’s own notion of equiprimordial unity of temporality, we must readily admit the equi-ontological status of having been into our noetical structure, understanding it as an operative horizon in which our future possibilities, our future being, are grounded in the present.

An Excerpt from A Philosophical Inquiry into Five Catholic Controversial Issues

A forthcoming article I am writing. Here is a section:

While perhaps not the most controversial issue inherent in the Catholic Church, priestly celibacy is nonetheless an issue that will provide a theological horizon in which further discussion of more controversial topics will benefit. Such an examination will expose both a particular complexity within the understanding of priestly celibacy, but also expose the broader complexity inherent to any and all Catholic belief and tradition. Within the nexus of the ‘tradition of priestly celibacy’ there combines several vital components that in and of themselves reveal the complexity of its own nature. On the surface, the tradition of priestly celibacy seems merely theological, that is seemingly uprooted from philosophical inquiry. The passerby of theological inquiry will unsurprisingly notice the constant correlation assumed and overtly articulated between priestly celibacy and scripture, sacred and ecclesial tradition and systematic theology. These are vital correlations, and we will indeed expand them in their entirety further on. Yet, it should not escape the reader that all the aforementioned ‘theological’ positions have an equally important philosophical counterpart. A mature theological position is informed by philosophical examination. But at the moment, it is important to lay the foundation of what informs such a position as priestly celibacy, the patchwork of many times convoluted systems of argumentation, methodology, and inquiry that form the broader “argument for priestly celibacy.”
However, as we will demonstrate, to even speak in terms of an “argument for priestly celibacy” is a bit misleading. Describing a particular tradition of the Catholic Church as an “argument” too easily characterizes the tradition as ‘merely dogmatic,’ and ceases to recognize the depth that such a historical tradition carries within its very existence and constant adherence. While the tradition of priestly celibacy most certainly has ‘dogmatic’ qualities that become responsible to the rigors of logic and the tests of reason, it cannot be reduced to the equivalence of a test tube in the scientist’s laboratory, or in this case the scrutiny of mere philosophical analysis. To reduce a living tradition to mere syllogism and debatable formulation denies the subjective qualities of a tradition that lives and breathes in those who subsist in it, abide by it, and faithfully trust in it. Such a warning is meant to guard against a total abstraction of a living tradition into mere data, when what is being abstracted has existential relationships that are made up of personal subjective qualities that no datum could capture. So while we will delve into the particular forms and nuance of theological and philosophical ‘argumentation,’ it is imperative that we (as author and reader) always be cognizant of the horizon of that which we are arguing about, a horizon not of abstract concepts and presuppositions, but of the real life of the millions who devote themselves in this manner to the Church and to Christ.

The Ontology of Tradition
Any investigation into a theological matter will almost always reference the umbrella term tradition. Indeed, there are not many more frequently used words in Christianity, nor more misunderstood concepts. Although we can only briefly touch upon what tradition is composed of as well as the depth of its being, our brief examination will still prove vital for our discussion of priestly celibacy, and will be a referential point for future issues...

A Tribute to Eleanore Stump

I believe that epistemology is not limited to empiricism.

A professor of New Testament at Union Theological Seminary in New York City specializes in the so-called ‘biblical historical method.’ This methodological approach to scripture has yielded many relevant and interesting aspects of the societal and cultural experiences that the Jesus of Nazareth would have experienced. However, it also has its downside, insofar that many of these theologians fail to run their conclusions through the rigorous systematic philosophical tests that are needed. This field of biblical scholarship has brought about a plethora of historical informative particularities that then lead to an adaptation in theologies. However, many times these adaptations fail the philosophical attempts at logical scrutiny. This biblical scholarship then develops a ‘detached theology,’ one independent of any rigorous academic philosophical argumentation. I give you an example from a lecture I happened to hear today. This is the scripture under his historical microscope:

1st Corinthians: 2: 1-8
When I came to you, brothers, I did not come proclaiming the mystery of God to you in lofty words or wisdom. For I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ, and him crucified. And I came to you in weakness and in fear and in much trembling. My speech and my proclamation were not with plausible words of wisdom, but with a demonstration of the Spirit and of power, so that your faith might rest not on human wisdom but on the power of God.
Yet among the mature we do not speak wisdom, though it is not a wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age, who are doomed to perish. But we speak God’s wisdom, secret and hidden, which God decreed before the ages for our glory. None of the rulers of this age understood this; for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

Now, he articulated his position through an organic style of argumentation, but for the sake of analytic philosophy I have compiled what I believe is an accurate reproduction of his argumentation but in the appropriate philosophic format. I see two arguments in his overall articulation. These premises of the first argument are:

1. The Book of Proverbs’ linguistic usage of ‘wisdom’ is historically understood as a representation of the Divine Feminine.
2. Paul, because he was an educated Jew, had a previous knowledge of the Book of Proverbs linguistic usage of ‘wisdom’ as the representation of the Divine Feminine.
3. Paul’s knowledge of the Old Testament’s usages of ‘wisdom’ concludes he also used the term ‘wisdom’ as a representation for the Divine Feminine in his epistle.

I am not arguing the historic process behind any of the argumentation, nor of the historical methodology that produced the information for the argument, I am neither a historian nor an archeologist. Rather, I am arguing against the philosophical logic and cohesiveness of such an argument.
First, premise one has the blanket, un-argued assumption that the writer of the Book of Proverbs specifically and univocally meant ‘wisdom’ to be only used in one meaningful interpretation, namely that of the Divine Feminine. However, because do not know for certain the intention of the author of Proverbs, it is entirely possible that this author’s intent was to have a multiplicity of meanings and interpretation for what is meant by ‘wisdom.’ There is no logical reason to assume that the author meant only one interpretation for the term ‘wisdom,’ especially given the claims by many historical critical methodologists that the Hebrew Bible is full of ambiguous meanings and multifaceted motifs. Additionally, it is also equally logical that the author of Proverbs had meant two meanings simultaneously, including for the sake of argumentation that of the Divine Feminine. For example, the author could have had in mind that the personification of wisdom to be the Divine Feminine as well as a future messianic figure. The unjustified assumption that the author’s intent was narrowly confined to one specific interpretation, and the even narrower assumption that it was the Divine Feminine, is a just that, an unjustified assumption, hardly convincing empirical evidence or logical veracity. Now, with these other logical possibilities, the conclusion of the entire argument has already been shown to be at best, narrow conjecture, but hardly empirical or logical certainty. However, for the sake of his argument, I will make their grandiose philosophical and logical assumptions in the attempt to demonstrate the complete illogicality of this argument.

The second and third premises has several philosophical and logical assumptions as well. First, and the most glaring and egregious of logical assumptions, is that the professor is assuming that it logically follows that because Paul knew of the author’s intent in the Divine Feminine interpretation in the Book of Proverbs that he used that same literary device in his epistle. (I am not arguing against him having this knowledge, although it seems logically questionable, but nevertheless.) The leap in logic can be summed in the following: even an irrefutable, empirically verifiable fact that Paul knew that the author’s intent was to interpret ‘wisdom’ as the Divine Feminine (or the tradition that said such) does not logically conclude that Paul then is articulating that exact same analogy to his usage of the term wisdom in his epistle. That assumption is completely unfounded in its logic, and hardly verifiable. It is just as equally possible, perhaps even more logical, that while Paul may have been educated in the Proverbs interpretation he may have meant something entirely unrelated to it. It is also a possibility that Paul meant absolutely nothing in common with an interpretation of Proverbs, but was just simply using the term wisdom in a different light. It is also possible that even if we grant that Paul may have been alluding to Proverbs, he could have been making an allusion to a Judaic mythology of wisdom, not the personification of the Divine Feminine as such. It is also possible that Paul may have been attempting to give credence to the Proverbs as Hebrew prophecy, as a sign pointing towards Jesus Christ. There are as many possibilities as people to interpret this passage. My point in this regard is that it is hardly logical to make the assumption the professor has, and illogical to articulate it as certainty.

Second Argument
1. Paul in the epistle describes the word ‘wisdom’ as something “secret and hidden” and writes that if the rulers knew this they would not have crucified Christ.
2. Because of Paul’s descriptive term of ‘secret and hidden’ for ‘wisdom,’ he is making a direct correlation between Christ and a ‘secret and hidden’ wisdom.
3. Thus, Paul is writing that Christ is the true Divine Feminine.

The second argument has many logical problems as well. First, if we make his assumption in premise one that Paul is alluding to a specific interpretation of Proverbs, it does not conclude to premise three, the assumption that he is making the statement that Christ is the Divine Feminine. It is just as entirely possible that Paul was alluding to the Divine Feminine and making an analogous statement that Christ is somehow like the Divine Feminine, but it is illogical to assume with certainty that he is the Divine Feminine. In other words, even if we grant the assumption that Paul was alluding to the Divine Feminine (which is not conclusive as we have demonstrated) it does not logically conclude that this alluding must be interpreted as convertible. If we grant this assumption, it is just as logical to assume that Paul was making an analogy, not a statement of fact that Christ really is the Divine Feminine.
Second, there is an unverified assumption that the description of ‘secret and hidden’ is specifically meant to be read as something inside Christ, an hidden truth of his being. This assumption seems to have no grounding in terms of the text, but rather a leap in logic. Furthermore, the text says, “But we speak God’s wisdom, secret and hidden, which God decreed before the ages for our glory.” Nowhere in this or the surrounding text imply that the God’s wisdom which is being ‘spoken of’ has anything to do whatsoever with who Christ actually is.
Finally the conclusion that Paul is articulating the position that if the rulers knew Christ was the Divine Feminine they would not have crucified him is equally unfounded. It is equally possible that Paul is addressing the fact that the rulers did not listen to those who spoke God’s wisdom. Or it is equally possible Paul is making a statement about rulers not know that Jesus was the Christ. In either situation, it would be quite a wide leap to make the assumption Paul is specifically meaning if only the rulers knew he was the Divine Feminine.
As a consequence, in these ways, the biblical historical method has failed in articulating with certainty any of their claims, nor have they demonstrated a likely possibility to them, and even more disheartening is the fact that it even fails in producing a logical and cogent argument.
I believe this attempt at the biblical critical methodology has accepted such ridiculously narrow parameters, namely empirical verificationism, because of their philosophical assumptions. I mean by this that because of certain assumptions made about God, they have condemned themselves to this increasingly narrow position. For example, the reason why many of these theologians argue for this hyper rationalist approach to the scripture is their philosophical assumption that God does not work in space and time. As such, the scriptures have to be approached as any other work of literature, to be dissected and placed under a microscope. However, what philosophical reason do they give for such an assumption of God’s ability? The answer is none, they make these wild assumptions without any articulation, any logical scrutiny, or any rigorous attempts at philosophic arguments. As such, they create a detached theology, one detached from the rigors of logic, and the systematizing of philosophy. So as I see it this enterprise (biblical critical method) has a lot of work to do before it becomes credible, first it must make all attempts to use rigorous attempts as logic, and when assumptions need to be made, make them, but do not claim certainty where certainty is not there. Second, they need to examine their philosophical assumptions of God and epistemology, argue for your beliefs, do not blindly accept what is in vogue. When these two critiques are at least attempted their enterprise will advance well beyond where they are now.

So what’s my point? We need more than the modernist empirical method to scripture. We deserve, and need more, than the biblical critical method.

St. Thomas on Grace and Love

I believe Grace is required for humanity to love God above all things.

Here are my brief notes on St. Thomas' question:

Concerning Grace
Question 3) Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things?


a. If man was not fallen, then he could love according to his natural power (of course still in need of the first movement).
i. To love God above all things is natural for all creatures.
1. This is because it is natural for all things loved to love back according to their natural power.
2. What is good for the ‘part’ is good for the ‘whole,’ since the whole (God) loves us (the part), we love God.
a. In the perfect state, man loved himself and all other things as parts of the whole. As such, he loved the whole (God) above all things, as it is the end of all things.
b. However, in our fallen state, without grace, man loves himself (the part) and follows his private good, not aware of the whole.
c. Therefore, man needs grace to heal this fallen nature so as to love God above all things.


Isn't this a perfect way at explaining the sin of individualism? So then what aspects of our lives are 'curved inward on ourselves' as Karl Rahner would put it, or "following our private good, not aware of the whole?"

Perhaps....Modernism? Postmodernism? Capitalism? Church?

On Confessionalism: Faithful Christian Witness

On Confessionalism: Faithful Christian Witness

Nicholas S. Case

Utrum: Whether it is the case that faithful Christian witness entails confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world.

Videtur: It may seem that faithful Christian witness does not entail confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world. It may also seem that Christian witness should be defined solely as ‘the pious living of one’s life.’ According to this argument, a person may be classified as witnessing to the Christian faith because he or she lives a life of pious devotion, which acts as the presupposed criterion of the Christian life. A common example of the pious life could be a person who gives his or her life to others in service, lives a charitable life of devotion to the Church, and participates in social justice, in God’s preferential option for the poor. According to this argument, if this person has accomplished the appropriate things in his or her life than he or she may be appropriately classified as a witnessing Christian. This belief system is particularly articulated as holding the criterion for faithful witness to Christianity as praxis. This position has been articulated historically by many liberation theologian ( See Gustavo Gutierrez, God-Talk: The Suffering of the Innocent. Also see, Paul Gauthier, The Poor, Jesus, and the Church. Also see, Sebastian Kappen, Jesus and Freedom. Also see, Camilo Torres, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Ernesto Cardenal, and Jon Sobrino) . These theologians would argue that God’s preferential commitment for the poor and oppressed demonstrates the power of Christianity as its ability to help bring justice to people who are oppressed. These theologians then argue that the ecclesiastical role is then measurable insofar as its impact on real, pragmatic items, such as how it influences the resistance to oppression. As such, the individual parishioner’s criterion for faithful witness to Christianity that is implemented is one of measurable accomplishments in the restoration of divine justice in practical, tangible form. It is important to remember that this restoration of divine justice is by its very nature empirically based, entirely demonstrative actions of justice accomplished by individuals. The role of the Christian becomes facilitator of God’s justice in a fallen, unjust world. Therefore, any person who participates in the restoration of divine justice in this world (in pragmatic, empirical actions that lead to social justice) may be accurately classified as faithfully witnessing Christianity. As a consequence, any confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world, because it is not an empirical demonstration of the restoration of divine justice in the practical world is not a necessary qualifier for being a faithful witnessing Christian.

Sed Contra: On the other hand, it may seem that the confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world is not entailed in faithful witness to Christianity because it is an exclusive doctrinal statement. It may seem that doctrinal statements, such as Christ as Savior, limit the full human expression and discovery of religion. This argument is elucidated by explaining that any creedal or formal doctrine (confession) narrows the number of Christians to an exclusive amount (Sometimes this is elucidated by denominations by the idiom, “No Creed but Christ.” See The Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) “The Design of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ)”) . One could also argue that this confession restricts the person’s ability to experience Christianity in his or her own way, one determined by the individual not dictated by a creedal statement. The attempt in this argument is at egalitarianism, tolerance, and inclusiveness for all people regardless of religious expression or education. This position would argue that to place a qualifier on Christianity that is creedal, in this case confessional, would limit Christianity to only those that have been educated in the faith. As such, this argument argues that to narrow faithful Christian witness only to those who confess dogmatic statements is to limit the Church to a very small minority of people in history. This argument argues that if faithful witnessing of Christianity entails the exclusive confession of Christ, the Church is alienating the vast array of the populace and in so doing the Church becomes divisive instead of inclusive. Some holding this position may also argue that people of other religions may be worshipping the Christian God, yet unaware that they do so (See Karl Rahner’s “Anonymous Christian”). As a result, faithful Christianity is adhered to by a different criterion and not by confessionalism, which is by it being dogmatic, exclusive.

Responsio: I answer that one inescapable and necessary qualifier of faithful witness to Christianity is the confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world.

Ergo: I reply to the first argument as failing on grounds of its presupposed belief that the criterion of Christianity is limited to a person’s actions. The argument that the qualifier of Christianity is something accomplished by humans, or work based, is contrary to traditional theological discourse. Christianity has traditionally argued that salvation is ontologically grounded in divine grace from God. This divine grace is not given to humanity because of actions a person has accomplished in their life, but rather out of a loving relationship and the merciful nature of God. If grace were given to humanity for actions accomplished, than grace would be secondary to action. If grace is secondary to action than humanity needs not grace, as pious merit-bearing actions were accomplished without it. Thus, this grace becomes a cheap, unnecessary gift from God.
According to St. Augustine , the incarnate Christ was not a natural occurrence; Christ was given to this world through divine intervention. In other words, Christ did not randomly occur, the incarnation was an intentional purposeful action (See St. Augustine’s Letter to Pelagius. Chapter 2). As such, Christ functions as the eternal giver of righteousness and salvation in humanity. Therefore, righteousness and salvation are not contingent on our works, but on the mercy of God and His incarnation. The incarnation being not of natural origin, requires a need on humanity’s part for salvation that is outside of its own natural ability. If humanity is need of salvation outside of itself, then salvation independent of divine grace is impossible. As a consequence, the criterion for faithful witnessing Christianity must include more than works which by itself is only of human hands. Thus, faithful witnessing Christianity must entail the confession of Christ as Savior of all the world.

St. Thomas Aquinas argued that a person may ‘merit’ something from God, in terms of divine justice, but this was contingent only because of the primacy of the gift of divine grace which came first out of the mercy of God. As such, St. Thomas argued that grace was the primary gift from God that allows for merit based works, and for our salvation which was merited through Christ (See St. Thomas’ Summa Theologica. Part III on the Merit of Christ). If divine grace must be primary to enable merit based works as meritorious, and if this divine grace is merited through Christ, then faithful witnessing Christianity must include the confession of Christ as Savior.
The argument for works also fails on scriptural grounds, particularly as demonstrated by Jesus in the story of the Prodigal Son. Jesus specifically demonstrates in this parable that the son which squandered his inheritance is no less loved by the father than the one who stayed home and was obedient. The ramifications of this parable demonstrate that works are not the criterion for justification. As these arguments demonstrate, salvation is not based on works, but given through grace merited through Christ. If the incarnation of Christ was not a natural occurrence, and if humanity was given Christ for our righteousness and salvation, then confessing Christ as Savior of all the world is a qualifier against those who deny the divinity and necessity of Christ. Therefore, in these ways, the confession of Christ as Savior must be a qualifier for Christianity.

I reply to the second argument as failing in its presupposed belief that the statement of Christ as Savior of all the world is uniquely exclusive in its statement. It is true that dogmatic statements express a belief in reality, a statement of what a group of people purport to be truth. As such, Christianity should bare no regret in descriptively and propositionally articulating what it believes to be truth. Any statement about how the real world functions is descriptive, but it also is a statement of rejection (See Christopher Morse’s Not Every Spirit, Via Negativa). If a person argues that the world is round, they are articulating a position that excludes the belief that the world is flat. Are those people then being intolerant to those who believe the world is flat? As rational humans, we constantly make statements about the world in which we live, if I throw something off a building it will fall, if I stand in a busy intersection, a car will hit me. These are all examples of statements of expressing reality, and as a result are excluding that which is not reality. The truth of reality is not contingent on us believing that this reality is true. Just as we as humans differentiate between objects, and make truth statements at a most basic level, we than too may make them on more complex levels as well. All people accomplish defining parameters and denying the beliefs of others, and as such confessing Christ as Savior is not unique in that is rejects other worldviews. Any statement, insofar as it reveals something about reality, is an exclusive statement. As such the fact that confessionalism is exclusive is not unique, but part of what it means to be a rational human. One may charge, isn’t there a difference between truth statements on a basic level than those on an religious level? The single criterion that is being met in both circumstances is one of purporting what reality is. There are obvious different levels of sophistication to reality, but whether we express that reality on a basic level of natural laws, or on a metaphysical level, each statements are attempts to define the parameters of reality, and as such both are exclusive. If all propositional statements are purporting a belief in the parameters of reality, then religious creedal statements are not unique in purporting a belief that is exclusive. Therefore, the confession of Christ as Savior of all the world is not alone in its exclusiveness and as such the argument against it as being uniquely exclusive fails.

The second argument also fails in its presupposed belief that egalitarianism, tolerance and inclusiveness is mediated through non-doctrinal statements. What is the goal of being tolerant if no one ever purported a belief statement? If no one ever made a statement about reality (which is an impossibility, but hypothetically) then there would never be a need for tolerance. The fact is the experience of our world is the opposite, humans do make statements of our world, and as such tolerance is something strived for because those disagreements of reality do exist. If there were not doctrinal statements, or statements purporting reality, then there would be no need for tolerance. If there is a need for tolerance, as the argument suggests, then that demonstrates a presupposed problem of adjudicating propositional statements of reality. In both cases, the second argument defeats its own purpose. Therefore the confession of Jesus Christ as Savior of all the world is one necessary, and inescapable qualifier for faithful Christian witness.

Cardinal Dulles

I was first introduced to Cardinal Dulles through a Jesuit Priest/Professor. His death is loss for the entirety of Christ's Church. Living in New York, I will always regret not having gone to hear him lecture. Nevertheless I was especially moved and influenced by his words of the Hereafter and in particular on Hell. I recommend it to you:

http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?id_article=488

I especially find his last paragraph one of the greatest syntheses of salvation I have read. It is a treasure not only to myself, but to many.

Truth vs. Pluralism

I believe in the eternality, universality and Truth that is God. I will demonstrate that this conviction will meet each of the ten criteria laid out in Christopher Morse's "Not Every Spirit." The first of the so-called “Ten C’s” that I will apply is continuity with the apostolic tradition. The three components of my statement are congruent with the apostolic tradition because it operates under both understandings of tradition. First, all three components are ‘handed down’ to Christians from history through the creeds, e.g. The Apostles Creed, The Nicene Creed and the Gregorian Creed of 594. Second all three components demonstrate the freedom of Christianity and point to the eternal salvation that the Christ represents. This freedom is eternal, universal and the truth as found in the Gospels. The second ‘C’ is congruence with scripture. My components in the statement meet the criterion for congruence with scripture as seen in the context of 1 Timothy 2:6 where the author shows the universal redeeming aspect of the Christ, “This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. For there is one God and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all men.” The third ‘C’ is consistency with worship; these components meet this criterion for two reasons. One, all three components have a history of usage in worship throughout the history of the Church. From St. Augustine to St. Thomas, all Christendom for centuries used liturgies that spoke of the three components of God, e.g. the Liturgy of the Hours. Second all three components of God are ‘preachable,’ as the universality of Christ’s redemption must be preached to all people.
The fourth ‘C’ is catholicity; this criterion is self evident given the components. The universality, eternality and truth of God are catholic, they by definition “extend everywhere, always, and upon all.” The fifth ‘C’ is consonance with experience, which the three components of God adhere to. All Christians experience the universality, eternality, and truth through our awareness of the redemptive power of Christ. Christians separated by class; society, geography, time and space experience together this universal power. This experience solidifies the body of Christ in all ages, giving us the experience of universality, eternality and truth of God. The sixth ‘C’ is conformity with conscience, which the components meet because the “outcome of the statement never leads to anything that is contrary to God’s Word.” This also allows for a freedom of conscience for people to determine their own understanding and even reject the Word of God. Because God is eternal, universal, and the truth all people have the ability to understand God, yet this triad also allows for people to use their conscience to reject God, as we are not born with the knowledge of God, it must be an acquired knowledge. The seventh ‘C’ is consequence, the statement meets this criterion because consequence implies future and the future of all three components is God itself. God is universal, eternal, and the truth and as a logical consequence God will always be universal, eternal and the truth. The material, created world will one day end as all causes except the first cause must at one point reach an end. When this occurs there will only be the triad God, as a consequence this allows for the freedom of humanity on Earth, but the ultimate victory of Christ.
The eighth ‘C’ is cruciality; the triad statement meets this criterion because cruciality implies that the doctrine must be crucial for both the short and long term consequences. The short term and long term cruciality of the statement implies that a Christian must always be both recognizing the eternality of God with knowledge that will be an end, yet also be aware of the present and be attentive to the universality and truth in our current time. This means the Christian must stand for the truth of God both now and forever. The ninth ‘C’ is coherence, the statement meets this criterion because it meets both an ‘internal coherence’ and an ‘external coherence.’ The internal coherence is demonstrated as follows: if God is eternal God must also be universal as whatever is eternal must apply to all time and space and what is universal, because it applies to all time and space, must also be eternal. Truth may be defined as a congruence with ‘the way things really are.’ Because ‘the way things really are’ must by definition be something in all time and space, if it is something that really is, then it adheres to both eternality and universality. The statement is also externally coherent as other disciplines and philosophies rely on the eternality, universality and truth of God. This is most notable in the work of philosophers up to the modern period. However, if a modern and postmodern is to adhere to the principle of the ‘universality of nature’ that all science is predicated on; it is adhering to the triad, namely something eternal, universal and truthful. In this way the statement meets the criterion of coherence. The final and tenth ‘C’ is comprehensiveness, which my statement meets because it meets the standards of dogmatic evaluations and critiques, as well as adds to current global matters. It contains presuppositions that all disciplines share, namely a basic belief in universality. Science, philosophy, psychology, and other fields rely on the universality of their principals; this triad statement gives validity to the vast array of current academic disciplines.

Thus religious pluralism is incongruent with Christianity.